









The New Politics of the Welfare State in the Age of Migration: 
Analysis of the Immigration-Welfare State nexus  












A master thesis submitted to the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität 






Candidate Name: Tae Kyeong Yun 










word count: 23,793 (with references) 
 2 
Table of Contents  
 
1. Abstract                                                           4 
 
2. Introduction                                                        5 
 
3. Theoretical background and literature review           11 
 
3.1 Welfare state development and ethnic/racial heterogeneity   11 
   
3.2 Welfare state and Immigration: Efficiency or Compensation hypothesis 14 
 
3.3 Changing welfare state       17 
 
3.4 Two mechanisms for immigration-welfare state nexus  
and general hypotheses          22 
 
4. Data and Methods        29 
 
4.1 Dependent variable        30 
 
4.2 Explanatory variable       32 
 
4.3 Control variables        32 
 
4.4 Difference in Differences       33 
 
5. Results and Discussion        35 
 
5.1 Descriptive analysis: welfare state and immigration   37 
 
5.2 Multilevel linear regression models      37 
 
 5.2.1 Main effect: inflows of immigrants upon different policy areas 37 
 
 5.2.2 Estimating possible mechanism 1: solidarity effect   42 
 
 5.2.3 Estimating possible mechanism 2: perceived risk effect  47 
 
5.3 Difference between social insurance and social investment   53 
 
6. Conclusion          55 
 
7. References         61 
          






List of Tables 
 
Table 1. Oesch’s collapsed 8 different occupational class schema, 32 
Table 2. Multilevel Linear Regression Models for the relative inflows of 
immigrants upon people's support for the welfare state in terms of Pension 
policy in 2008 and 2016. 
38 
Table 3. Multilevel Linear Regression Models for the relative inflows of 
immigrants upon people's support for the welfare state in terms of 
Unemployment policy in 2008 and 2016. 
38 
Table 4. Multilevel Linear Regression Models for the relative inflows of 
immigrants upon people's support for the welfare state in terms of 
Childcare policy in 2008 and 2016. 
39 
 
Lists of Figures  
 
Figure 1. Graphic model of the effect of inflows of immigrants on welfare 
attitudes of people (people’s support for social policies) and two possible 
mechanisms. 
26 
Figure 2. Bivariate relationship between percentage of relative inflows of 
immigrants and percentage of social expenditure of GDP in 2007 
(Left, r= -0.18, p= 0.47) and 2015 (Right, r= -0.02, p= 0.95). 
35 
Figure 3. Graph of difference in differences upon the pension policy. 41 
Figure 4. Marginal effects of interaction between inflows of immigrants 
and the levels of interpersonal trust upon pension, unemployment, and 
childcare policy in the year of 2008 and 2016. 
43 
Figure 5. Marginal effects of interaction between inflows of immigrants 
and the different occupation-based social class positions upon pension, 
unemployment, and childcare policy in the year of 2008 and 2016. 
48 
Figure 6. Coefficient plot of inflows of immigrants upon trade-off question 
between unemployment benefits and education in 2016 (including 






1. Abstract  
 
In times of increasing international migrations, there has been growing interest in 
understanding the consequences of immigration to the welfare state. Previous literature has 
been inconclusive: one the one hand, scholars argue that immigration undermines public 
support for the welfare state (efficiency hypothesis). On the other hand, there have been studies 
suggesting that immigration might increase support for the welfare state (compensation 
hypothesis). Hence, this research proposes two mechanisms that provide dynamic perspectives 
into the existing literature: solidarity and perceived risk effects. Each of the effects investigates 
how different levels of interpersonal trust and occupations influence the welfare support of 
people with the inflows of immigrants. Furthermore, this research highlights the 
multidimensionality of the welfare state within the analysis of immigration-welfare state nexus 
by differentiating social insurance (pension and unemployment policies) and social investment 
policies (childcare policy).  
Based on multi-level linear regression models by using the data from the European 
Social Survey (2008/2016), the findings show a variety of outcomes across different years and 
social policies. There is evidence that immigration possibly undermines people’s support for 
social policies in recent years, especially for social insurance policies. The low level of trust 
and the higher degree of perceived risk associated with immigration appear to lead to lesser 
support only for the unemployment policy, whereas the case of pension policy shows the 
opposite. The childcare policy as a social investment policy report not statistically significant 
results, yet the findings implicate that people might be more supportive of childcare policy 
with inflows of immigrants. Consequently, this research reveals that there are different 
directions of people’s support towards social insurance and social investment policies 
regarding the effect of immigration. Furthermore, when the trade-off question is considered, 
people prefer the social insurance policy over social investment policy. As a result, this 
research not only attempts to provide dynamics of immigration-welfare state nexus but also 










2. Introduction  
 
The global mobility of people is not a new phenomenon. It has a long trajectory in our 
history. However, there has been an increment in the volume of international migration across 
the globe and the movement of people in our contemporary world is becoming larger in scale 
(Castles & Miller, 1998). For instance, according to an OECD report (OECD, 2017), it is 
readily observable that numbers of international migration have been increasing since 2012 
across OECD countries. Particularly in the year 2016, the inflows of immigrants sharply appear 
to achieve their peak level as average level is increased by 15 percent since 2007. ‘The main 
change in 2016 [is] the striking rise in migration flows to Germany which reported around 1 
million new permanent migrant entries, equivalent to a 50% increase compared to 2015’ 
(OECD, 2018, p. 20). This trend of a surge in migration can lead to a great degree of 
implications for our contemporary society.  
Albeit migration can be broadly defined as ‘a permanent or semipermanent change of 
residence’ (Lee, 1966, p. 49), it is not merely about migrants’ spatial and physical changes 
from one place to another place. Migration also bears consequences that can be associated with 
various political, cultural, and social issues. One of the prominent issues around migration 
derives from the relationship between migration-led ethnic/racial heterogeneity and the welfare 
state since ‘ Europe is […] the land of redistributive policies as it devotes to social policies a 
larger fraction of GDP than any other continent or large country in the world’ (Boeri, 2010, p. 
651). Moreover, Mau and Burkhardt (2009, p. 213) assert that ‘[t]he welfare state can be 
understood as a social arrangement for coping with collective risks and reducing social 
inequality [and the welfare state is designed to strengthen the bond between the state and citizen, 
and between citizens]’. Therefore, immigrants are often considered as outsiders and its inflows 
can challenge the notion of the welfare state and its social policies. For instance, according to 
Eurobarometer data (European Comission, 2018), 56 percent of respondents address that they 
perceive immigrants as burdens on their country’s welfare system. This not only demonstrates 
the natives’ hostility towards immigrants when considering their country’s welfare state, but 
also brings forth questions regarding the relationship between the welfare state and 
immigration.  
Despite the importance and salient consequences of immigrant flows such as the issues 
concerning the welfare states, classical theories of the welfare state seem to mainly focus on 
social class, political parties, and economic determinants such as power-resource theory. They 
often fail to consider the dynamics between immigration and the welfare state. However, there 
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has been increasing a number of studies that question the relationship between inflows of 
immigrants and the welfare state or people’s support for the welfare state.   
There is an on-going debate concerning how the inflows of immigrants can influence 
the welfare state as a whole and the people’s attitude towards it. For instance, a study conducted 
by van Oorschot (2006) shows that immigrants are often conceived as the least deserving 
category of people after the elderly, sick and disabled, and unemployed people. Hence, the 
intricate linkage between increasing inflows of immigrants and welfare state brings forth the 
question of ‘who should get what, and why?’ (Oorschot, 2000, p. 34). On the one hand, scholars 
suggest the “efficiency hypothesis” that argues that the inflows of immigrants undermine the 
welfare state and its social policies. Alesina and Glaseser (2004), who investigate the 
association between a degree of ethnic/racial heterogeneity and the welfare state, claim that 
‘ethnic heterogeneity and fractionalization are a principal reason why the United States has a 
weaker welfare state than Western Europe. In contrast, Europe has more generous welfare 
states partly because of ethnic homogeneity’ (Brady & Finnigan, 2014, p. 20).  
On the other hand, several scholars propose the “compensation hypothesis”. They 
assert that there is no negative relationship between the ethnic/racial heterogeneity and people’s 
support for the idea of redistribution and welfare state’s social policies (Taylor-Gooby, 2005; 
Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Brady & Finnigan, 2014; Goldschmidt, 2015). In fact, the main 
argument of the compensation hypothesis is that the inflows of immigrants can reinforce the 
people’s support for the welfare state and its social policies.  
Considering these inconclusive findings of pertinent literature, the present research 
seeks to explore the relationship between the inflows of immigrants and people’s support for 
the welfare state. More precisely, this research examines the effect of inflows of immigrants 
on people’s support for the welfare state, whether the former undermines or reinforces the latter. 
Whereas much of the existing studies have stressed the significance of individual determinants, 
such as material self-interest, and non-material determinants, like norms in relation to the 
migration-welfare state nexus and welfare attitude formation of people (Iversen & Soskice, 
2001; Kumlin, 2007; Mau 2004; van Oorschot 2006), this research proposes two different 
mechanisms that bring a dynamic perspective into the existing literatures: solidarity and 
perceived risk effects. Beyond the self-interest and norms, these two effects highlight the 
perceptions of reality such as perceptions of poor or unemployed (Larsen, 2006) in terms of 
understanding the relationship between immigration and the welfare state.  
Solidarity effect derives from the anti-solidarity argument, which suggests that the 
higher level of heterogeneity caused by migration can lead to a lower level of interpersonal 
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trust within a society, which eventually undermines the welfare state and its social policies 
(Van Parijs, 2004; Ervasti & Hjerm 2012). Hence, this research examines whether or not a 
lower level of trust associated with the heterogeneity can undermine the social policy support 
to a greater degree in comparison to other groups. It also examines how different levels of trust 
interact with inflows of immigrants upon social policy. Furthermore, as prospective theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) argues that people overweight the loss over the gain under 
uncertainty and risk, perceived risk effect looks at how people’s different degrees of perceived 
risk interact with the inflows of immigrants upon their welfare attitudes. As perceived risk can 
be more visible in the labour market, this research utilises Oesch’s (2006) occupation-based 
social class schema. His new social class schema includes both hierarchical levels with 
marketable skills and horizontal levels with different work logics such as an organisational 
work logic and an interpersonal work logic. Each work logic differs from the other by the 
setting of work processes, relations of authority, primary orientation, and skill requirement. 
Overall, the perceived risk effect aims to figure out if people’s higher perceived risk leads to 
lesser support for the social policy and how the level of support differs by different 
occupational groups. Hence, this research focuses on the division of new middle classes and 
the division between manual and non-manual occupations.  
In addition to the inclusion of two different mechanisms in order to understand the 
immigration-welfare state nexus, unlike previous studies, this research takes into account the 
notion of multidimensionality of the welfare state. Most preceding literature does not make a 
distinction between social policies in relation to analysing the relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state. This discussion derives from Pierson’s (1998; 2001) 
prominent work on understanding the politics of the welfare state as the politics of 
retrenchment. Pierson characterises the welfare state as an “immovable object”, which refers 
to the difficulties of altering the welfare state’s status quo. Yet, several scholars manifest that 
welfare state should be understood in terms of “changing welfare state” (Bonoli 2007; 
Hemerijck, 2013; Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012), which hints at how the welfare state has been 
reshaped over time through several reforms. Consequently, this research takes two different 
approaches of social policy into consideration regarding the effect of inflows of immigrants 
upon people’s support for the welfare state. Firstly, the social insurance policy refers to a more 
traditional understanding of social policy from the old welfare state, which is designed to repair 
people from risks such as pension and unemployment benefits. Secondly, the social investment 
policy from the new welfare state encompasses the policies that are meant to prepare people 
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beforehand they experience risks, such as education and childcare policies, that aim to promote 
human capital.  
This research empirically examines the immigration-welfare state nexus by conducting 
several multilevel linear regression models. This method appears to be suitable since the micro-
level individual’s welfare attitude or support towards the social policy is nested within 
countries at the macro level. The data of the European Social Survey are utilised covering 18 
different European countries (excluding for Israel), especially the data on the welfare attitudes 
in the years of 2008 and 2016. This research focuses on welfare attitudes regarding the pension, 
unemployment, and childcare policies: the pension and unemployment represent the social 
insurance policy, while the childcare represents the social investment policy. Each policy area 
was chosen since they are the most relevant policy areas of the welfare state. Pension and 
unemployment policies have been considered as one of the main pillars of the welfare state 
(Häusermann, 2010) and the importance of childcare policy has been stressed in previous 
studies for understanding the new welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 2002). Two different times 
(2008/2016) are analysed in this research to comprehend the general trend over time. The 
analysis also includes the descriptive part, where this research parsimoniously examines the 
welfare magnet theory (Borjas, 1999) that suggests the immigrants tend to move to countries 
where the welfare state is relatively generous. This descriptive analysis is intended to grasp the 
understanding of the relationship between immigration and the welfare state. Afterward, the 
effect of relative inflows of immigrants upon three different policies are examined as the main 
effect at the national level. It is followed by analyses of interactions between different 
interpersonal trust levels and occupations, and inflows of immigrants upon the pension, 
unemployment, and childcare policies. 
The outcomes of this research show a great degree of variations across different years 
and social policies. When the main effect of inflows of immigrants is considered upon three 
different social policies, only the case of pension policy demonstrates a tendency that people 
tend to be less supportive with the inflows of immigrants. This finding reveals that the pension 
policy still holds considerably established strong interest groups with a broad number of 
supporters compared to unemployment and childcare policy. Moreover, this finding shows that 
the welfare state is an umbrella term as different policy areas experience the effect of the 
inflows of immigrants respectively and differently. In terms of different levels of interpersonal 
trust, there is a shift of general patterns regarding the influence of immigrants upon different 
levels of trust. Overall, the general directions of three social policies shows that people are 
more supportive of social policies in 2008, while it is the opposite case in 2016. Interestingly, 
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the results of different levels of trust and occupation suggest more dynamics among different 
levels of trust and occupations in the year of 2016 since the effect of inflows of immigrants in 
2008 appears to be more or less neither statistically nor substantively significant. 
More specifically, in terms of solidarity effect, people with higher trust levels tend to 
be less supportive of the pension policy with inflows of immigrants than people with a lower 
level of trust. And people with the lowest trust tend to be less supportive of the unemployment 
policy with inflows of immigrants. In the case of perceived risk, the degree of perceived risk 
only appears to matter in terms of unemployment policy in 2016. People with higher perceived 
risk tend to be less supportive towards unemployment policy with inflows of immigrants. When 
it comes to the division between new middle classes (managers vs. socio-cultural professionals), 
the manager appears to be less supportive than socio-cultural professionals for the pension and 
unemployment policies. The comparison between manual and non-manual occupations 
(production workers vs. managers/socio-cultural professionals) show that manual skilled 
occupation like production workers are more attentive to unemployment policy with inflows 
of immigrants, whereas non-manual skilled occupations are more concerned with the pension 
policy. In sum, a low level of trust and a higher degree of perceived risk associated with 
immigration appear to lead to lesser support only for the unemployment policy, whereas the 
case of pension policy shows the opposite. 
In line with analyses of different interpersonal trust and occupations, the differentiation 
between social insurance and social investment policies shows quite a different picture. In 2016, 
people tend to be less supportive of social insurance policies (pension and unemployment 
policy) regardless of different levels of interpersonal trust and occupations. Although the social 
investment policy (childcare policy) turns out to be statistically not significant, it shows a 
direction that people are more supportive of social investment policy. Intriguingly, when the 
trade-off question is considered between social insurance (unemployment policy) and social 
investment (education), the result demonstrates that people prefer to have the social insurance 
policies at the expense of social investment policies.  
In sum, this research aims to understand the effect of inflows of immigrants upon 
people’s support for social policies. It extends the analysis of the effect of inflows of 
immigrants by adding two mechanisms that bring a dynamic perspective to the immigration-
welfares state nexus: solidarity and perceived risk effects. These two effects examine the 
different levels of trust groups and occupations. This research shed a light on not only the 
importance of considering different social groups, but also on the differentiation between social 
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insurance and social investment policy. As a result, it reveals complicated implications of the 















































3. Theoretical background and literature review  
 
3.1 Welfare state development and ethnic/racial heterogeneity  
There has been vast academic literature to understand the question of why the welfare 
state has emerged with different approaches especially within the discipline of political 
economy. Many theories respectively suggest the development of the contemporary welfare 
state according to what is the driving force and underpinnings of the welfare state. For instance, 
one of the approaches within the previous studies in late 1960s and early 1970s, the logic of 
industrialism (Wilensky, 1975) considers the industrialisation as the driving force of the 
development of welfare state with the disintegration of traditional forms of social protection 
and state’s adaptation of the changes caused by modernisation and urbanisation. 
As dominant approaches of the welfare state development, on the one hand, authors 
emphasise the importance of the domestic forces such as power-resources and class 
mobilisation theory (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990). On the other hand, some scholars 
are proponents of globalisation or global economic forces as the impetus for the welfare state 
development (Cameron, 1978; Ruggie, 2003).  
The power-resource theory acknowledges the significance of domestic determinants 
such as politics. Hence, it focuses on party politics and class-based mobilisation around 
political resources. It sees the state or political institutions as arenas where ‘class-related 
distributive conflicts and partisan politics [take place]’ (Korpi, 2006, p. 168 as cited in 
Rothstein, Samanni, & Teorell, 2012, p.3). It also considers the ‘social classes as principal 
agents of change and social policy as a function of the balance of power’ (Schustereder, 2010, 
p. 15). Therefore, it is argued that the balance of class power or the class struggle over limited 
power and political resources, eventually, are accountable for welfare state development and 
distributional outcomes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Eger, 2010). In this manner, the power-
resource theory contends that the rise of working-classes and their political formation in order 
to increase their interests of the idea of redistribution through unionisation and labour 
movement lead to the welfare state development. Furthermore, the theory is acknowledged that 
the welfare state development is not dependent on a single class formation but political 
coalition-building is necessary in order to strengthen the labour power (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  
The power-resource theory ‘[adds] nuanced arguments on the role of collective action 
through parties and unions [… and it emphasises] the feedback effects of policies on collective 
mobilization and [supports] the constituency-party link’ (Häusermann, Picot, & Geering, 2013, 
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p. 225). Moreover, this theory allows room for the dynamic and the role of politics and social 
class, especially the demands of organised workers within the political sphere, rather than 
merely considering the role of the modernisation or economy. Nonetheless, the power-resource 
theory is one of the useful and successful approaches in explaining the welfare state 
development than other approaches, it has been faced several criticisms as well. 
One of the critiques of the power-resource theory can be drawn from Häusermann et 
al.’s (2013) study that examines the traditional partisan politics approach (Hewitt, 1977) in 
relation to the welfare state. The traditional partisan politics mainly assumes the close 
association between party affiliation that is based on the individual’s class position and policy 
outcome or the development of the welfare state. Similarly, in the line of logic of the power-
resource theory, the working class is considered as the main constituency of the left-wing party 
with a favour of the idea of redistribution since people within the working-class stratum are 
more likely to be beneficiaries of the welfare state. Thus, the left-wing parties are considered 
as a driving force of the welfare state. ‘Thereby, politics is often seen in an overly simplified 
way, as a simple transmission belt conveying the preferences and demands of various interest 
groups to the leaders, who implement them’ (Häusermann et al., 2013, p. 225). Furthermore, 
Pierson (1996) states that the association between the left-wing party and the welfare state 
development has weakened over time. And the central assumption of the power-resource 
theory, the direct linkage between political party and constituency, has been challenged with 
the new approaches such as “changing electoral constituencies” (Häusermann et al., 2013). For 
example, the working-class people are not anymore merely keen to vote for the left-wing 
parties, yet today they show a tendency to vote for a populist right-wing parties (Oesch, 2008; 
Rydgren, 2012; Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015). In sum, it appears to be the case that it is 
difficult to postulate a clear boundary between pro-welfare state ideology and against-welfare 
state ideology based upon one’s social class and/or party affiliation.  
Another critique of the power-resource theory comes from the arguments of scholars 
who take into account the globalisation as a part of their analysis for the welfare state 
development. They highlight the role of globalisation as an underpinning for the welfare state 
development rather than the domestic determinants like power-resource theory. ‘In its simplest 
terms, the argument states that economic openness [through globalisation] increases the 
insecurity of workers in the large exposed sectors of the economy, and bigger welfare states 
were specifically designed to cushion the impacts of growing international competition’ (Myles 
& Quadagno, 2002, p. 43; see Cameron, 1978). This openness economy literature points out 
that the power-resource theory overemphasises the role of the labour-power and party politics 
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in relation to the welfare state and its policy outcomes. As a result, the power-resource theory 
largely neglecting dynamical structural changes of economy and the rise of different political 
actors such as transnational corporations under globalisation that might influence the national 
labour movement or mobilization and, eventually, the construction of the welfare state 
(O’Connor & Olsen, 2018).  
One of the issues of the welfare development studies that engages with the 
globalisation is that they are mostly coupled with economic perspectives by stressing the 
liberalisation of the economy and the process of integration into the global economy. It is 
conceivable to argue that changing the constellation of the world economy bears certain 
domestic consequences including the welfare state development. Yet, it is not only the 
economic factors that matter but also the transformation of the social demography is a 
significant aspect of globalisation. Consequently, other pundits began to explore different 
social and demographic variables in order to understand the development of the welfare state 
with the undergoing social and structural changes under globalisation. One of the prominent 
approaches looks at the ethnic and racial components of societies both with existing and 
increasing ethnic and racial heterogeneity of countries, especially regarding international 
migration.  
Within the literature, that deals the relationship between the welfare state and 
ethnic/racial heterogeneity, the influential work of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) asks why there 
is a less developed welfare state in the United States of America compared to Europe and why 
Americans are less willing to the idea of redistribution from rich to poor. They included 
different explanatory factors into their analysis including economic explanations, the role of 
political institutions, and racial heterogeneity. Their findings suggest that there are relatively 
no significant effects of the economic explanations, but the development of political 
institutions over the history, and racial and ethnic heterogeneity explains the most of reasons 
why Americans are less interested in the idea of distribution and the welfare state than 
Europeans. They argue that ethnically homogenous European countries is able to have a 
relatively unified labour movement and mobilisation, which could facilitate the wide range of 
support for the idea of welfare state and social policies, whereas the racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity of the American society hampers to have stronger labour movements and led to 
the failure of having a broad support for welfare state in the United States (Alesina & Glaeser, 
2004, p. 108; see Lipset & Gary, 2000). Furthermore, they highlight the potent of the ethnic 
and racial diversity in the society to be adopted as manipulative political vehicles as a part of 
the political process since ‘racial hatred is endogenous and often created by entrepreneurial 
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politicians’ (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004, p. 136). They conclude their findings by saying that 
‘[a]cross countries, racial fractionalisation is a strong predictor of the degree of redistribution 
[...] if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divisions will be used 
to challenge the generous welfare state’ (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004, p. 11).  
The study of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) to a extend seems to be a mixture of the 
power-resource theory and the effects of globalisation regarding the changes of the social and 
demographic compositions. They emphasise both the role of the politics together with labour 
mobilisation and racial/ethnic heterogeneity prompted by globalisation. However, what if the 
relationship between the degree of ethnic/racial heterogeneity and the welfare state is not 
necessarily placed at the political level but it might be drawn from the day-to-day aspects of 
people?  
Luttmer's (2001) demonstrates the similar findings with Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
by approaching to the question of the association between racial/ethnic heterogeneity and the 
welfare state with the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). His findings demonstrate 
that it is not only the financial self-interest that formulate the welfare attitudes of people but 
also the racial group loyalty can play a role in terms of individuals’ determination for the 
attitude towards the welfare state. Furthermore, he finds that ‘individuals increase their support 
for welfare spending as the shares of local recipients from their own racial group rise’ (Luttmer, 
2001, p. 501). Therefore, he demonstrates the correlation between ‘demographic homogeneity 
and generosity of redistribution’ (Luttmer, 2001, p. 519).  
There exists a considerable body of studies that demonstrate the importance of race 
and ethnic heterogeneity in relation to the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Luttmer 
2001). Consequently, this research is based on this theoretical context and attempts to 
contribute to the understanding of relationship between ethnic and racial heterogeneity, and 
welfare state, especially people’s support for the welfare state. This research does not intend to 
understand the racial and ethnic heterogeneity as tools of usage in a political process or a 
determinant that might influence the labour mobilisation. Yet, it rather attempts to comprehend 
them as one of the dynamic changes of social composition and demography with increasing 
number of international migrations since ‘[i]t is the pace of social change rather than the fact 
of [racial and] ethnic diversity per se that stands out here as politically unsettling’ (Kymlicka 
& Banting, 2006, p. 293).  
 
3.2 Welfare state and Immigration: Efficiency or Compensation hypothesis 
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As Alesina and Glaeser (2004) predict that Europe will face welfare challenges in the 
future with the increasing numbers of immigrants, several studies have developed to address 
the question of the relationship between the welfare state and immigration. The welfare magnet 
hypothesis (Borjas, 1999) can be a comprehensive description of the association between the 
welfare state and immigration. Although the welfare magnet hypothesis is developed 
particularly in the case of the United States, it argues that the generous welfare state works as 
a sort of magnet that attracts and pulls immigrants who otherwise would not migrate to the 
destination country. One of the assumptions of this hypothesis is that the cost of moving within 
a country for a native person in contrast to an immigrant is higher than the interstate welfare 
beneficial differences and ‘immigrants arriving in the United States are a self-selected sample 
of persons who have chosen to bear the fixed costs of the geographic move’ (Borjas, 1999, p. 
609). This can lead to the phenomena that the immigrants can be ‘clustered in the states that 
offer the highest welfare benefits’ (Borjas, 1999, p. 609.) because of their ability to choose a 
destination where they think the welfare benefits are generous than other places (welfare 
shopping), ‘while welfare recipients in the native population are “stuck” in the state where they 
were born’ (Borjas, 1999, p. 609). Borjas’s (1999) welfare magnet hypothesis seems to be 
similar with the push-pull theory of migration (Lee, 1966). Lee asserts that the migration 
happens with the calculation between positive factors that pull immigrants, such as safety and 
employment, and negative factors that push immigrants like insecurity and unemployment. 
However, both of these theories do not take different facets of migration into accounts such as 
the migrant network or migration policy. This might simplify the complex relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state. Therefore, the question of whether or not immigrants show 
a tendency to move to a place where the welfare state is generous remains unanswered.  
The relationship between the welfare state and immigration can also be understood 
through the native’s attitude or opinion towards immigrants. The question of deservingness is 
often associated as an important issue to be addressed. For example, van Oorschot’s (2006) 
studies the public perception of deservingness among four different social groups that are in 
the need of support including 1. elderly people, 2. sick and disabled people, 3. unemployed 
people, and 4. immigrants. His findings suggest that ‘[...] informal solidarity is highest towards 
elderly people, closely followed by sick and disabled people, next there is the solidarity towards 
unemployed people, and solidarity towards immigrants is lowest’ (van Oorschot, 2006, p. 37). 
It is noteworthy that this rank order is a common trend across twenty-three different European 
countries. Likewise, similar findings can be found from Gilens (1999) who stresses the 
significance of racial stereotypes when it comes to the understanding the Americans’ support 
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for the welfare state. According to him, the Americans are in favour of the welfare state in a 
way to help the poor, yet they are concerned with the recipients of the welfare state. ‘[T]he 
American public thinks that most people who receive welfare are black, and [... they think] that 
blacks are less committed to the work ethic than are other Americans’ (Gilen, 1999, p. 3). 
Hence, Blacks are depicted as a poor, lazy, and undeserving group of welfare benefits.  
With the above-mentioned points, a number of existing studies in the broader literature 
examine the question of whether or not immigrants have a negative impact on people’s support 
for the welfare state. Eger (2010) examines the particular case of Sweden where the welfare 
system is different from many of the previous studies since they often utilise the case of the 
United States. She assumes that the welfare programs that benefit all are more likely to gain 
general popularity, while programs that benefit certain parts of society or social groups are less 
likely to be supported by people. However, in the case of Sweden, despite its universal social 
programs, reveals that immigration including foreign-born population and recent immigration 
both at the country and regional level do have a negative impact on Swedish people’s support 
for the welfare state. This implies that immigration posits a negative impact upon people’s 
attitude towards not only the welfare state with means-tested programs but also the welfare 
state with universal benefits even if it means that natives will get less benefit as well. A more 
recent study of Breznau and Eger (2016) investigate the influence of immigrants’ presence both 
at the country and the regional levels on the group boundaries and support for the welfare state 
in western Europe. They conclude that ‘[t]he more immigrants visible or known to be present 
within natives’ national borders, the more likely that group boundaries become salient and 
support for the welfare state may wane’ (Breznau & Eger, 2016, p. 209). With the line of 
argument of Alesina and Glaeser (2004), several studies imply that immigrants are often 
perceived as welfare (fiscal) burdens (Gilens, 1999; Luttmer, 2001) and the low degree of 
public perception of deservingness towards immigrants, which lead to the less support for the 
welfare state (van Oorschot, 2006). These views, which manifest that immigration can 
undermine the welfare state and/or public support for the welfare state, are often called the 
“efficiency hypothesis”.  
However, in contrast to the efficiency hypothesis, other scholars suggest an alternative 
hypothesis, which is called the “compensation hypothesis”. The compensation hypothesis 
dissent from the idea of a trade-off between ethnic/racial heterogeneity and redistribution. It 
posits the argument that in fact inflows of immigration increase people’s support for the welfare 
state. For instance, Brady and Finnigan's (2014) comparative study, which examines the 
relationship between immigrants and public support for social policies, suggests the 
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compensation hypothesis. Their findings notably reveal that the increasing number of 
immigrants increase the support for the social and social policies because people would 
demand greater degree of protection since immigration can increase people’s perceived risks 
such as a greater unemployment and increased labour market competition (Kunovich, 2004). 
A similar argument is shared with different studies. For instance, Burgoon, Koster, and van 
Egmond (2012) investigate the impact of immigration upon the people’s support for the 
redistribution. Nonetheless, they argue that the implication of immigration can be varied at 
different levels, their findings support the compensation hypothesis.  
The question of the relationship between the people’s support for the welfare state and 
immigration remains questionable due to the inconclusive findings. Therefore, this research 
attempts to explore the relationship between immigration and the welfare state. It mainly looks 
at inflows of immigrants unlikely to some exiting studies that consider the foreign-born 
population as their main variable (Burgoon et al., 2012; Breznau & Eger, 2016; Soroka, 
Johnston, Kevins, Banting, & Kymlicka, 2016a). It is because the paper assumes that inflows 
of immigrants can refer to a recent change that people respond more than actual information 
(Castro, 2003 as cited in Schmidt-Catran & Spies 2016). Moreover, it is because inflows of 
immigrants can be understood as salient and visible demographic changes rather than the 
foreign-born population that is already residing in the country. Yet, it does not mean that this 
research neglects the important implication of foreign-born population, thus this research also 
takes into consideration of foreign-born population, thus included as a control variable. 
Moreover, this paper looks at welfare attitude in terms of the public support for the welfare 
state because ‘[p]ublic support is [...] a manifestation of the preferences of the constituencies 
of beneficiaries of welfare programs’ (Svallfors, 2007 as cited in Brady & Finnigan, 2014, p. 
19). Also, the changes of public support can be an indicator in order to unfold the question of 
immigrants and the welfare state since the ‘[w]elfare programs are large, complex, slow-
moving entities that do not change overnight’ (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006, p. 292). Besides, 
this research engages more with the welfare state literature that is not limited to the traditional 
understanding of the welfare state but the new welfare state literature with the notion of 
changing welfare state. 
3.3 Changing welfare state  
 
 The study of the welfare state has flourished in the period of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
main interests of scholars at that time were to understand the determinants for the emergence 
of the welfare state, and its expansion and maturation. However, the aftermath of the golden 
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age of the post-war period of the welfare state expansion, with economic and political 
landscape changes, many pundits ‘began to speak of a crisis of the welfare state [… that] was 
inspired by the idea […] that the redistributive logic of the welfare state was contradicted by 
the logic of capitalism’ (Clayton & Pontusson, 1998, p. 67). This welfare crisis rhetoric is 
observable from the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States with the Thatcher’s 
and Reagan’s several reforms of the welfare state. Consequently, these fundamental changes 
of the welfare states have led to the discussion of the politics of the welfare state among 
scholars. As a result, the studies of the welfare state began to integrate with the term with 
welfare retrenchment. 
The welfare retrenchment can be broadly defined as ‘any intentional action on the part 
of government that decreases the generosity of the welfare state or forces individuals back into 
labour market without retraining’ (Krogslund, 2016, p. 10). With these changes of the welfare 
state, which is not only about the changes of social expenditure per se, yet it is also about the 
new political dynamic, new structure and the context of the welfare state itself, Paul Pierson 
(1994; 1996; 2001) advocates the notion of the “new politics” of the welfare state. The 
argument of Pierson is that the politics of the welfare retrenchment (the new politics of the 
welfare state) is fundamentally different from the politics of welfare development or expansion 
(the old politics of the welfare state). Furthermore. it is not the process that extrapolates from 
the welfare expansion. He says that the welfare retrenchment is not ‘the mirror image of welfare 
state expansion [… but], it is a distinctive process, it is unlikely to follow the same rules of 
development that operated during the long phase of welfare state expansion’ (Pierson, 1996, p. 
151, 144). The new politics of welfare state argument have led to the debate whether the old 
and new politics of welfare state are in fact fundamentally different as Pierson argues or the 
welfare expansion theories are able to explain retrenchment as well (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Some studies demonstrate that factors of old politics still matter. They argue that ‘[s]ocio-
economic, partisan and institutional factors are still important, and in the same causal directions 
assumed by the “old” politics theories’ (Siegel, 2000, p. 84 as cited in Green-Pedersen & 
Haverland, 2002, p. 44). 
One of the distinctions Pierson makes between the old and the new politics of the 
welfare state is that the politics of the retrenchment is about “blame avoidance” rather than 
“credit claiming” as in the old politics of the welfare state. It is because of the unpopularity of 
the welfare cult that comes with the high electoral costs. Therefore, governments and 
politicians attempt to avoid the responsibility of the retrenchment by utilising different 
strategies including the endeavours to diffuse the consequences of welfare cut over time or 
 19 
obfuscate the trace of the welfare cut. However, Pierson finds that the notion of new politics 
of welfare state, which implies the complex and dynamic adjustment of the welfare state and 
its politics, turns out to prove that the welfare state is quite resilient. His findings demonstrate 
that there have been no radical changes in advanced welfare states as he contends: ‘There are 
powerful political forces that stabilise welfare states and channel change in the direction of 
incremental modifications of existing policies. […] The welfare state now represents the status 
quo, with all political advantages that this status confers’ (Pierson, 1996, p. 174).  
Pierson offers different reasons for the idea of welfare state resilience. First, with the 
discourse of history matters or institutionalism, it is argued that more or less well-established 
welfare state institutions reflect the path dependency as policy legacies of previous or existing 
structural patterns continue to influence the new politics and policies. Consequently, it is 
unlikely to have radical changes in these ‘locked-in’ situations of policies but the ‘[changes are 
…] likely to take place only within existing structural frameworks’ (Starke, 2006, p. 106). 
Moreover, the previous welfare expansion with its popularity established well-organised 
interest groups that are well-resistant to the radical changes of the welfare programme. For 
example, “policy-takers” can be considered as one of the obstacles for the retrenchment. They 
are ‘political groups created by the existence of a policy, by their shared interest in the 
perpetuation and expansion of [the] policy’ (Offe, 1981; 1985 as cited in Levy, 2010, p. 555). 
These policy-takers include not only the beneficiaries of the welfare programmes but also the 
providers who are ready to mobilise against the welfare retrenchment.  
The new politics of the welfare state literature has been criticised by its neglects of 
dynamics of party politics (Ross, 2000) as it tends to assume the fixed ideological positions of 
the left- and right-wing parties in terms of the idea of redistribution: left-wing party with pro-
welfare state ideology and right-wing party with against-welfare ideology. Hence, the 
important role of the political party, party system, and party competition have been emphasized 
in different studies (Green-Pedersen, 2002). But more importantly, there have been different 
approaches that propose the notion of “changing welfare state”. The notion of new politics of 
the welfare state from Pierson’s significant work manifests the idea “welfare inertia”, the 
difficulties of altering the welfare state’s status quo. To what extent is it possible to consider 
the welfare state as an “immovable object facing irresistible forces” (Pierson, 1998)? is it 
possible to say that has not been much of changes of the welfare state over time?  
Hemerijck (2013) calls out for a new approach to re-appraise the welfare state that 
encompasses a more open and dynamic institutional perspective, which is not limited to such 
dichotomies of old versus new politics or welfare expansion versus retrenchment. He contends 
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that there have been different reforms, which reconstruct and reconfigure the welfare state over 
time, to meet the needs of the new social risks across different policy fields. Thus, the welfare 
state should be comprehended beyond the welfare state as the ‘biased “new politics” conjecture 
of change-resistant’ (Hemerijck, 2013, p. 40). In this way, the author asserts that Pierson’s 
analysis upon the welfare state resilience is over-deterministic. According to Hemerijck, the 
welfare state should be understood in the context balance between the dynamic and mutual 
interactions between the inputs of irresistible forces (post-industrial pressures such as growth 
of service sector, maturation of the welfare state, and demographic ageing) that causes the 
novel social and economic environmental contexts, and the policy responses, which 
corresponds to the adaptation of the new environments. Consequently, Hemerijck asserts that 
welfare state change is not an easy process, but it does not mean it is not happening. 
Consequently, he suggests the concept of “welfare recalibration” that is referred to ‘all 
initiatives that aim to transform the welfare state into a new configuration […] with the intent 
of being better able to cope with the adaptive challenges of intensified international 
competitiveness, relative austerity, demographic ageing, and the changed structure of labour 
markets and families’ (Hemerijck, 2013, p. 104). Similar views of Hemerijck have been shared 
by different scholars. For example, Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) demonstrate how different 
adaptations and reform agendas of the welfare states can take place because of distinct 
institutional contexts and designs of the welfare states with the internationalisation of the 
economy. Clayton and Pontusson (1998) contend that the welfare state has been under 
reconstruction with the emphasis on the service sector. Allan and Scruggs (2004) reject the 
idea of the path-dependency of institutional arrangements that hinders the process of welfare 
change.  
If the welfare state is subject to change, which welfare state can be considered as a 
modern welfare state today? Hemerijck (2013) suggests three different waves that have 
changed and reshaped the configuration of the welfare state over history. He indicates the first 
wave as the golden age of welfare expansion with Keynesian economic policy, the second wave 
of welfare retrenchment with the rise of neoliberalism, and the third wave as the social 
investment era. He suggests that the modern welfare state is currently in the third wave where 
the provisions of social investment began to emerge. Therefore, Hemerijck proposes that the 
modern welfare state should be comprehended beyond the context of the traditional 
understanding of social insurance policy. There have been several reforms across countries, as 
he gives examples of OCED and European Union, towards the orientation of social investment 
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policy with the disenchantment of neoliberal governments and the electoral success of centre-
left in the late 1990s.  
The social investment approach emerged as a policy response to the on-going 
economic and social order changes and the critique of the neoliberal social policy at the end of 
the 1990s. The welfare states face new challenges with the transformations of demography, 
family, and the labour market that might reshape ‘the social risk structure, creating a wholly 
new set of societal winners and losers’ (Esping-Andersen, 2002). The emergence of new social 
risks from the deindustrialisation, tertiarisation of employment, and women’s entry into labour 
market (Bonoli, 2007) have reoriented several welfare states’ policy direction. The old welfare 
states more or less focus on the social insurance policy, which is the traditional understanding 
of social policy and aims to repair people from risks (social protection) including pension or 
unemployment benefits. In contrast to the social insurance policy, the social investment policy 
addresses the preparation of people to various changes and transformation beforehand people’s 
experiences of risks. Moreover, there is a shift of focus from the traditional male-breadwinner 
to diverse and inclusive groups such as females and children under the social investment policy 
approach. Hence, the social investment policy ‘rests on policies that both invest in human 
capital development […] and that help to make efficient use of human capital, while fostering 
greater social inclusion’ (Morel et al., 2012, p. 2). The crucial feature of the social investment 
approach is that social policy is considered as a “productive factor”, which reconstructs the 
past passive policy to more active forms of policy in order to enhance the economic growth 
and employment. It often implies education, life-long learning, child-care, supporting women 
and single parents, and active labour-market policies.  
With the literature of changing welfare state, this research does not merely consider 
the welfare state in relation to the old welfare state or limited to the social insurance policy 
approach. If the welfare states are ‘[re-channeling] social expenditures toward social 
investment’ (Palier, 2006, p. 114), it is important to takes into account dynamics between the 
social insurance and social investment policy for the analysis of the association between 
inflows of immigrants and people’s support for the welfare state. In this way, this research 
suggests the contemporary welfare state to be understood with the notion of 
“multidimensionality” of the welfare state. As Hemerijck says ‘it is true that social insurance, 
together with healthcare, constitutes the largest expenditure item of the modern welfare state, 
but to view social insurance as the pars-pro-toto of the modern welfare state hides an important 
selection bias’ (Hemerijck, 2013, p. 26). The comprehension of these two different social 
policy approaches does not delimit the understanding of the modern welfare state. Furthermore, 
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it will allow this research to make a distinction whether or not there are any differences between 
the social insurance and investment approach when it comes to the people’s support for the 
welfare state with the inflows of immigrants. 
 
3.4 Two mechanisms for immigration-welfare state nexus and General hypotheses 
 
As Castles (2010) urges scholars to conceptualise migration as ‘an integral and 
essential part of social transformation process’ (Castles, 2010, p. 1578), there is no doubt that 
flows of new people, idea, and culture across borders construct and reconstruct all kinds of 
social relations both in home and host country. It is not one way understanding of either 
migration being a cause or a consequent of social transformation, ‘[M]igration [rather] both 
shapes social transformation and shaped by such fundamental change’ (Hear, 2010, p. 1533). 
This implies the complex and dynamic of interrelations between migration and social change 
that have a great implication on various issues. Therefore, this research is particularly interested 
in the influence of inflows of immigrants as macro-level upon welfare attitudes of people as 
micro-level and as a part of social changes.   
A number of previous studies have focused on the individual level determinants 
regarding the formation of the welfare attitudes of people. There are two dominant approaches 
to the welfare attitude formation that are useful to understand the linkage of macro-micro 
relation of this research. Thus, the rational choice theory that stresses the material self-interest 
and another approach that highlights non-material determinants such as social values and 
norms are briefly summarised here. Furthermore, this research proposes to utilise two 
mechanisms that could possibly demonstrate the linkage and to bring a more dynamic 
perspective to the existing literature: solidarity and risk perception effects. 
First, the rational choice theory or choice theory that has developed mainly in 
behavioural economics has been one of the dominant approaches across different fields of 
social science. This theory broadly assumes that the actors are acting rationally, thus the 
outcome of a decision is consciously chosen by a rational actor through consideration of 
available information and the calculation of costs and benefits (Hedström & Stern, 2008). This 
theory also follows the legacy of assumptions of utilitarianism (Mill, 1972): 1. ‘what is best for 
society is nothing but the sum of what is best for each individual […] 2. what is best for the 
individual is best understood by the individual himself’ (Lewin, 1988, p. 29). This approach 
emphasises the notion of “materialistic self-interest” upon the attitude formation of individuals. 
Within the comparative welfare literature, this material self-interest has been shown as an 
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influential factor in shaping people’s welfare policy preferences (see Iversen & Soskice, 2001). 
‘The self‐interest hypothesis holds that welfare state attitudes are not reflections of affectively 
charged and stable values. Rather, people are instrumental and narrowly egoistic in a material 
sense, choosing on the basis of personal benefits and risk‐reducing consequences of policies’ 
(Kumlin, 2007, p. 370).  
Second, the welfare attitude studies have been highlighted the importance of non-
material determinants like social values and norms, especially within the discipline of 
sociology. This approach questions the rationality of actors and contends that the behaviours 
or attitudes of individuals to make a decision can be influenced by social norms, values, and 
rules within a given context. Consequently, one of their premises is that ‘[p]erceptions and 
preferences [might] not simply constructed by an individual decision maker: they are afforded 
by the decision maker’s [social and cultural] environment’ (Savani, Cho, Baik, & Morris, 2015, 
p. 458). Mau (2004) argues the importance of the normative dimension in terms of 
understanding the welfare attitudes of people. People’s support for the welfare state is not only 
depended on the material self-interest but also the ‘moral purposes of the welfare state 
programmes’ (Mau, 2004, p. 67), such as reciprocity and social justice. The argument of norms 
also includes the notion of deservingness (W. van Oorschot, 2006) as people’s normative 
perception of to what extent the welfare benefit is worthy and to whom it is worthy.  
The self-interest or social norms and values are important factors to understand the 
macro-micro level relationship of this research. However, aligning with Larsen (2006), this 
research adapts the “political man perspective” in order to understand the mechanisms of 
macro-micro linkage. ‘This implies a reflective individual, where attitudes towards welfare 
policy are not only guided by self-interest or abstract societal values and norms but also based 
on concrete perceptions of the reality; in this case the perceptions of the poor and unemployed’ 
(Larsen, 2006, p. 5). Therefore, this research proposes the two mechanisms that possibly link 
the inflows of immigrants to individuals’ welfare attitude potentially through self-interest or 
social norms: solidarity effect and perceived risk effect. Moreover, these two effects allow this 
research to look at the effects of inflows of immigrants at the different social groups rather than 
a national level.  
First, the solidarity effect through public responsiveness can provide a mechanism of 
how inflows of immigrants affect the welfare attitude of people. Public responsiveness 
describes that people react and respond to societal changes or trends. The certain demographic 
and societal changes prompted by inflows of immigrants can create a reaction of natives that 
lead to their modification of attitudes (Taylor, 1998). This research considers the level of 
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interpersonal trust in terms of assessing the question of to what extent the people react to the 
social changes with the inflows of immigrants. It is because of the possible association between 
heterogeneity and trust or solidarity. The higher degree of heterogeneity within a society can 
promote a lower level of trust and solidarity across different groups (Van Parijs, 2004) that can 
eventually strain the welfare support or policies. It can be explained through the group conflict 
theory that argues various groups within a society compete each other over the limited 
resources such as welfare benefits in this research. It appears to be the case that this anti-
solidarity argument sees a homogeneity of society as a prerequisite of the welfare state with a 
high level of trust and solidarity. Consequently, it agrees with the generic argument of Alesina 
and Glaeser (2004) who contend that the ethnic and racial heterogeneity would undermine the 
people’s welfare state support. This research takes a further step from the assumption of the 
association between trust and heterogeneity. And it considers the people with different levels 
of trust that can interpret the different experiences of inflows of immigrants. Therefore, this 
analysis examines whether or not the low level of trust associated with the heterogeneity can 
undermine social policy support to a greater degree in comparison to other groups. Also, it 
examines how different levels of trust interact with inflows of immigrants upon the social 
policy. 
The interpersonal trust as the solidarity effect can be interpreted to social norms or 
self-interest. On the one hand, trust and norm have a trivial but at the same time a complex 
relationship. They are entangled in a way they become bases for each other. Trust can be 
understood as a ‘necessary step and [a] basis for the evolution of spontaneous social convention’ 
(Falcone, Castelfranchi, Lopes Cardoso, Jones, & Oliveira, 2013, p. 224). One adjusts his or 
her behaviours accordingly to the predicted behavior of the other and simply trusts the others 
to behave conformingly in order to avoid conflict unless the anticipated behaviour is explicitly 
disagreed. On the other hand, trust can be seen as a rational action of individuals that people 
anticipate a certain degree of profit by trusting someone (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011). 
This leads to trust as a behaviour that can be coupled with the self-interest of individuals. As a 
result, interpersonal trust as a reaction to social changes can be considered as a mechanism to 
understand the macro-level of inflows of immigrants and the micro-level of the welfare attitude 
of people via norms and self-interest.  
Secondly, the perceived risk effect refers to people’s perception of risk in relation to 
social changes that are caused by the inflows of immigrants might change people’s decision or 
attitude. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of behavioural economics provides a 
mechanism for how people make a decision under uncertainty and risk through the notion of 
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self-interest calculation. One of the intriguing results of this theory is that, by setting the 
reference points to gain and lose rather than net changes of assets, people are prone to overvalue 
the loss relatively compare to gain (loss aversion). Furthermore, ‘people tend to give more 
weight to the utility of a possible outcome than to its probability of occurrence as long as 
probabilities are not small’ (Levy, 2003). Prospect theory implies that the social uncertainty 
associated with inflows of immigrants can lead to a higher degree of perceived risk among 
people. Furthermore, it can potentially induce anti-immigrant sentiments among natives. Thus, 
in general, this might lead to erosion of the welfare state support since ‘there is evidence that 
anti-immigrant sentiments are highly correlated with the view that immigrants exploit the 
welfare system’ (Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006 as cited in Brady & Finnigan, 
2014, p. 21). For example, immigrants are often depicted as the least deserving social group 
for the welfare benefit (W. van Oorschot, 2006) or the fiscal burden that natives have to pay 
off (Luttmer, 2001). Therefore, perceived risk can also be understood in terms of self-interest 
and norms.  
The level of perceived risk can differ from one social group to another. One of the 
common places where the level of perceived risk can be relatively visible is the labour market. 
It is because of the influx of new people brings up the potential labour market transformation 
that would lead to people’s perceived new risks. For instance, the native populations’ myth of 
‘immigrants take away native’s job’ (Chomsky, 2007) would render people to feel a greater 
perception of the loss or social risk. It includes a fear of unemployment or a feeling of the threat 
with the increasing competition in the labour market. Hereby, this research is interested in 
understanding the relation between inflows of immigrants and people’s support for the welfare 
state not only at the national level but also at the level of occupation where people might be 
exposed to immigrants at different levels. It aims to figure out if the social uncertainties caused 
by inflows of immigrants possibly lead people to be less supportive of the social policies. Also, 
this research tests whether or not people’s higher levels of perceived risk leads to less support 
for the social policy and how it differs by different occupational groups by utilising the 
occupation-based social class scheme of Oesch (2006). 
 Oesch (2006) argues that the transformation of our employment structure and labour 
market including the growth of the service sector, welfare expansion, and feminisation of the 
labour market leads to a necessity of a new occupational based class scheme. He shifts the 
traditional class scheme’s hierarchical division, such as simple differentiation between manual 
and non-manual workers, to more horizontal divisions. He stresses marketable skills and work 
logics of different occupations in order to redraw the class map. He identifies four work logics: 
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‘independent logic, a technical work logic, an organisational work logic and an interpersonal 
work logic’ (Oesch, 2006, p. 64). This research focuses on a technical, an organisational, and 
an interpersonal work logic. A technical work logic covers occupations that require technical 
expertise from technicians to production workers, while individuals belong to an organisational 
work logic when their occupations ask for coordination and control skills with a primary 
orientation towards organisations such as managers and clerks. The last work logic, an 
interpersonal work logic, is added in order to expand the horizontal aspects of the class scheme. 
It refers to the occupations with service-specific or face-to-face work that require a certain 
social skill. Each of the work logic has several dimensions according to the setting of a work 
process, relations of authority, primary orientation, and skill requirement that can distinguish 
various occupations within each work logic. This research particularly utilised Oesch’s (2006) 
occupational class scheme because it can reflect more recent employment and labour market 
structure, and its inclusion of the horizontal aspect of the divisions of occupations.  
 
Figure 1. Graphic model of the effect of inflows of immigrants on welfare attitudes of people 
(people’s support for social policies) and two possible mechanisms. 
 
 
Although Oesch (2006) proposes 8 different occupation-based social classes. This 
research focuses on the three occupations: (associated) managers, socio-cultural (semi-) 
professionals, and production workers. The class positions of (associated) managers (hereafter 
managers) and socio-cultural (semi-) professionals (hereafter social-cultural professionals) 
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represent the hierarchical level (marketable skills) that are combined by the professional and 
managerial level with associate professional and managerial level. Yet, they are horizontally 
divided as the class of managers being considered under the organisational work logic and class 
of socio-cultural professionals under the interpersonal service work logic. The inclusion of 
these two occupations is aimed to understand the division within the new middle class since it 
is argued that the new middle appears to be quite a heterogeneous social class group (Kriesi, 
1998). As he expects that managers to be “right-authoritarians” and socio-cultural professionals 
to be “left-libertarians”, the inclusion of these two occupations would comprehend the 
understanding of (political) value orientations of each occupation and the implication on the 
party politics. In addition to the division between managers and socio-cultural professionals, 
the class position of production workers is taken into account. This class position belongs under 
the technical work logic (horizontal dimension) and its marketable skills (hierarchical 
dimension) are being considered as vocational level or low/un-skilled. Inclusion of production 
workers would be utilised to understand the classical division between manual and non-manual 
skilled classes, which can imply the different levels of perceived risk.  
 As solidarity effect suggests that heterogeneity in a society induces a low level of trust 
within people, which eventually undermines the welfare state and its social policy. And as 
perceived risk effect suggests potential anti-immigrant sentiment among people because of the 
uncertainty and risk alongside the inflows of immigrants that can undermine the welfare state. 
This research posits the first hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 1: inflows of immigrants can possibly undermine the people’s support for the 
welfare state and its social policy (H1).  
 
Moreover, this research assumes that the effect of inflows of immigrants upon the people’s 
support for the social policy expects a variety of outcomes related to different levels of 
interpersonal trust and occupations. Therefore, in line with the first hypothesis, this research 
posits two sub-hypotheses. Firstly, as anti-solidarity argument suggests that migration-induced 
heterogeneity would lead to a low level of trust in the society, which eventually undermines 
the welfare state. Therefore, first sub-hypothesis is posited as following in order to understand 
whether or not the low level of trust associated with the heterogeneity that can undermine the 
social policy support at a greater degree in comparison to other groups: 
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Hypothesis 1a: People with a lowest trust would show lesser support towards social policies 
with inflows of immigrants (H1a). 
 
Second, it is often argued that migrants have a narrow range of occupations, which are more 
or less understood as low-skilled occupations. This argument partly derives from the migrants’ 
relative low skill profile in comparison to natives (Burgoon et al., 2012). Hence, the more 
exposure to the presence of immigrants at the occupational level can lead to a greater degree 
of perceived risk, which can be translated into lesser support for the welfare state and social 
policies. Moreover, Boeri's (2010) study on the welfare access and net fiscal position of 
migrants suggest that ‘being unemployed negatively affects perceptions about migrants only 
among the unskilled. Concerns about unemployment related to migration and the crowding out 
of assistance to the poor are also felt more among the unskilled […]’ (Boeri, 2010, p. 665). 
Consequently, this research compares the manual and non-manual skilled occupations in order 
to examine the how they differ with the different levels of the perceived risk. And it posits the 
second sub-hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Occupation with a higher degree of perceived risk would show lesser support 
towards social policies with inflows of immigrants (H1b). 
 
However, this research does not posit a hypothesis for the difference between the new middle 
classes. It rather aims to have a descriptive analysis of how these two occupations might differ 
or not with their attached value orientations.  

















4. Data and Methods  
This research utilises data sets from the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is one of 
the leading social surveys that have been utilised by many different studies. It aims not only to 
produce the data that can assist to understand the general trend within and between European 
countries, but also ‘to rectify longstanding deficits in the rigour and equivalence of comparative 
quantitative research, especially in attitude studies’ (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, & Eva, 2007, 
p. 10). Therefore, it is a cross-nation survey with a focus in Europe including different themes 
such as immigration, citizen involvement, and politics.  
As this research examines the influence of inflows of immigrants upon people’s 
support for the welfare state and its social policy, the particular theme of welfare attitudes at 
ESS is utilised. The characteristic of this research question led to the application of multilevel 
linear regression models since the research question aims to understand the cross-level effect. 
In other words, the multilevel linear regression model seems adequate because this research’s 
lower-level entities – the welfare attitude of people – are nested within a higher level, which is 
different countries. The analysis contains two different times, the years of 2008 and 2016. It is 
not to measure the individual’s welfare attitude change over time since it is cross-sectional data. 
It is rather to have a picture of dynamic shifts of general welfare attitudes of people. Hence, 
the wave of ESS 4 (2008) and ESS 8 (2016) are utilised. Moreover, the analysis includes 18 
different countries mostly different European countries excluding Israel: Belgium, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. This includes a 
comprehensive set of countries to reflect different regions of Europe, which might be helpful 
to understand the general trend across Europe.  
 
4.1 Dependent variable  
 For the dependent variable, this research examines three different welfare attitudes of 
people. These different welfare attitudes are not only to consider the multidimensionality of 
the welfare state but also to look at the specific social policies instead of a general picture of 
the welfare state. The most prominent understandings of the multidimensionality of the 
welfare state derive from the discussion of whether there are ongoing reforms of the welfare 
state in order to adapt to the new socio-political environments or the welfare state is still 
considered as the frozen welfare state that reforms do not take places. The changing welfare 
state with different reforms advocates the new welfare states are adapting the social 
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investment aspect of social policy that is meant to prepare the people from the new risks, 
while the welfare inertia adheres social insurance aspect, which aims to repair people from 
the risk. Therefore, in order to distinguish these two different dimensions of the welfare state, 
this research focuses on three welfare attitudes: pension and unemployment policy for the 
social insurance dimension, and childcare policy for the social investment dimension. The 
overarching question of these three welfare attitudes are from ESS of each wave: ‘People 
have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For 
each of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you 
think governments should have. 0 means it should not be governments’ responsibility at all 
and 10 means it should be entirely governments’ responsibility’. 
 Different welfare attitudes are based on the above-mentioned overarching question 
and combined with different endings. For pension, the question is ended with ‘...ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for the old?’ In the case of unemployment, it is combined with 
‘...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?’ And for childcare policy, it is 
ended with ‘...ensure sufficient childcare services for working parents?’. These questions of 
governments’ responsibility for social services or benefits seem to be suitable to understand 
whether or not people support these policies. Furthermore, the ESS questionnaire clarifies 
several terms within the questionnaires. The term standard of living across three welfare 
attitude questions refers to the material situation of people. The status of unemployed refers 
to the people who are out of the labour market and does not have a paid job. In addition, the 
childcare services include day-care services for children or childminders while parents are 
out working.  
In the case of the trade-off question, this research utilises the question of following: 
‘now imagine there is a fixed amount of money that can be spent on tackling unemployment. 
Would you be against or in favour of the government spending more on education and 
training programs for the unemployed at the cost of reducing unemployment benefit?’. 
Respondents could answer in four different ordinal scales: strongly against, against, in 
favour, and strongly favour.  
4.2 Explanatory variable 
This research relies on the relative measures of inflows of immigrants as an 
independent variable. This variable shows the relative inflows of the immigrants into countries 
in terms of the country’s total population of 2007 and 2015. A year before of each ESS surveys 
data of inflows of immigrants are utilised. It is because this research assumes the inflows of 
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immigrants into countries, which might change the social composition and demography of the 
society, would be expressed by respondents after a certain period rather than in the same year 
of surveys. The data of the total population of countries are drawn from World Bank open data, 
which combines different demographic data including the united nations population data and 
Eurostat according to each year. The numbers of inflows of immigrants are drawn from the 
international migration database of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OCED). The number of inflows of immigrants excludes people who are born or hold 
nationality in European Union, European Economic Area (EEA), and some countries where 
the data were not available such as The Turks and Caicos Islands. Then, the numbers of inflows 
of immigrants are divided by the total number of populations in order to have relative measures 
of inflows of immigrants. Therefore, the relative inflows of immigrants refer to the percentage 
of inflows of immigrants reflecting each country’s total population.  
This explanatory variable is utilised firstly at the descriptive analysis, which attempts 
to understand the relation between the relative inflows of immigrants and the social expenditure 
spending of countries (generosity of the welfare state). This parsimonious bivariate analysis 
looks at the percentage of total social expenditure spending of countries as aggregated data as 
calculated from the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from OCED. It contains 
different branches of social welfare that governments share their expenditure such as old age, 
health, family, unemployment, and housing.  
In addition to the main explanatory variable, different interaction effects are analysed 
in the research. Firstly, interactions between relative inflows of immigrants and the levels of 
interpersonal trust are introduced in order to examine the anti-solidarity argument. Therefore, 
the question of interpersonal trust from each ESS wave is utilised. The question asks ‘generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too 
careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted’. For the multilevel linear regression 
models, the group of a lowest level of trust is assigned as the reference group. Moreover, 
interactions between relative inflows of immigrants and people’s different occupations are 
examined. As it is argued in the theoretical backgrounds, the social class schema of Oesch 
(2006) is utilised for the analysis. He proposes the detailed 16 different class positions 
according to both hierarchical and horizontal dimensions of class positions. Yet, this research 
uses the collapsed version of Oesch’s (2006) social class schema, which results in 8 different 
social class positions. Occupations are divided into two hierarchical levels combining 
professional and managerial level with associate professional and managerial level, and 
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combining skilled working class level with the low-skilled working-class. Furthermore, for the 
horizontal level, which divides into different levels according to the work logic. This leads to 
the collapsed 8 class schema: 1. large employers and self-employed professionals, 2. small 
business owners, 3. technical (semi-) professionals, 4. production workers, 5. (associated) 
managers, 6. office clerks, 7. socio-cultural (semi) professionals, and 8. service workers. For 
example, According to Oesch (2012), typical occupations for socio-cultural professionals are 
medical doctors and teachers, for managers are administrators and consultants, and for 
productions workers are carpenters and assemblers. 
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4.3 Control variables  
A range of individual control variables is introduced in the multilevel linear regression 
models. Individual control variables include levels of education, household income, 
occupational social class position, the foreign-born population within the sample, age, and sex. 
The levels of education are drawn from each wave of ESS, which indicates the highest level of 
education of respondents. The levels are classified by the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED). This includes educational levels from less than lower secondary 
education to higher tertiary education level. Education might not only affect the welfare attitude 
of people as it is argued that higher education is related to pro-welfare state attitude but also 
related to the political tolerance and positivity towards migrants (Bobo & Licari, 1989; 
Naumann & Stoetzer, 2018). Nevertheless, it is known that family income is correlated with 
education attainment (Blanden & Gregg, 2004), this research controls for the household income 
of respondents as an additional variable for material interests of individuals. Oesch’s (2006) 
occupation-based social class position is added into several models as the control variable since 
it differentiates the horizontal and hierarchical dimensions of social class, which can be 
distinguished from the levels of education and household income. Furthermore, the foreign-
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born population within the sample is introduced as a control variable since it is possible that 
respondents’ migrant backgrounds might lead to a different attitude towards the welfare state 
and social policy. Age and sex are included as well since they are identified as important control 
variables because they might affect economic interests, work orientation, and social policy 
preference from previous studies that investigate the welfare attitudes (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; 
Burgoon et al., 2012; Schmidt-Catran & Spies, 2016).  
Besides the individual control variables, country-level controls are the unemployment 
rate, GDP per capita, human development index, and foreign-born population of countries. The 
unemployment rate of each country is drawn from the harmonised unemployment rate from 
the database of OCED. It is defined as ‘the unemployed as people of working age who are 
without work, are available for work, and have taken specific steps to find work’ (OECD, 2019), 
which allows more international comparable measures. The unemployment rate might both 
affect the people’s attitudes towards the welfare state and inflows of immigrants (Soroka et al., 
2016). Furthermore, GDP per capita, which is drawn from the World Bank, is controlled 
because it can capture the welfare state development or the macro-economic level situation of 
countries, which can influence the welfare attitudes of people. As Mau and Burkhardt (2009) 
questions the relationship between inequality, diversity, and welfare attitude, this research adds 
Human Development Index in order to control the pre-existing inequalities that are not only 
limited to income inequality. The foreign-born population at the national level from OCED is 
controlled alongside the individual level of the foreign-born population. 
 
4.4 Difference in differences  
The method of difference in differences (DID) estimation is utilised in order to 
hypothetically examine the main effect of increasing inflows of immigrants upon social policy. 
DID is a method that mimics the experimental design and therefore often uses the fact that 
there are two groups in two time periods. Furthermore, DID is often used to assess the cross-
level effect that is the effect of higher group-level on individuals that are nested within groups. 
‘Because observations are grouped, errors are correlated across individuals within groups; 
models that do not account for this correlation will result in misleadingly small standard errors 
and incorrect inference’ (Rokicki, Cohen, Fink, Salomon, & Landrum, 2018, p. 2). 
Consequently, the method of DID seems suitable since this research uses two different time 
period, the years of 2008 and 2016, as two different waves of ESS are used and there is a 
hypothetical treatment, which is the increased inflows of immigrants. ‘When the outcome of 
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interest is measured before and after the treatment [i.e. increased inflows of immigrants] in 
both the treatment and the control group, a comparison of changes in the outcome can be 
attributed to the treatment’ (Naumann, 2014, p. 31). The countries were, therefore, divided into 
control and treatment groups according to the fact if a country experience the increased inflow 
of immigrants from 2008 to 2016. Control groups include Switzerland, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, The United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia. The treatment group includes 
Germany, Spain, Belgium, Finland, France, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
and Sweden. In order to get rid of potential confounding variables, the same individual and 




















5. Results and Discussion  
5.1 Descriptive analysis: Welfare state and Immigration 
 Following the theoretical backgrounds, this research firstly considers the relation 
between the percentage of relative inflows of immigrants and the percentage of the social 
expenditure spending from Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each country. This parsimonious 
descriptive analysis aims to identify the welfare magnet theory (Borjas, 1999), which argues 
that the more generous welfare states attract more immigrants.  
Figure 2. Bivariate relationship between percentage of relative inflows of immigrants and 
percentage of social expenditure of GDP in 2007 (Left, r= -0.18, p= 0.47) and 2015 (Right, r= 
-0.02, p= 0.95).  
 
In contrast to the welfare magnet theory (Borjas, 1999), the results of the bivariate 
association between the relative inflows of immigrants and the social expenditure spending 
show a negative and more or less no relationship. Figure 2 demonstrates the associations of 
both the years of 2007 and 2015, which allows the comparison of difference of 8 years. In 2007, 
nonetheless, the association is shown as significant, the correlation appears to be quite weak 
(r= -0.18, p=0.47). Thus, from both years, it appears to be the case that it is inadequate to say 
that the results are supporting the welfare magnet theory. In 2007, some countries like Spain 
and Slovenia seems to have a relatively higher level of the inflows of immigrants with a higher 
percentage of social expenditure spending. Yet, France, Finland, and Portugal show the 
different cases that the higher percentage of social expenditure spending is not related to the 
level of inflows of immigrants. In 2015, there is a slight change in the slope, which shows 
mostly no relation between the percentage of social expenditure and the level of inflows of 
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huge increase in inflows of immigrants (from 0.7 percent in 2007 to 2.5 percent in 2017) with 
not a great difference in the percentage of the social expenditure spending. In addition, Ireland 
experienced a decreased level of inflows of immigrants with its remained lower level of social 
expenditure. These two countries might appear to be supporting the welfare magnet theory. 
Many other countries such as France, Finland, and Sweden remain their similar positions of a 
higher level of social expenditure with a lower level of inflows of immigrants. In the case of 
Spain, nevertheless Spain has relatively higher social expenditure spending, the result 
demonstrates that there has been a decreased level of inflows of immigrants from 2.1% to 0.6%. 
Consequently, Figure 2 shows a great heterogeneity of the association between the inflows of 
immigrants and the social expenditure spending across countries. Moreover, it seems that 
overall the welfare magnet theory might not be supported according to the above results.  
This simple descriptive analysis could imply that different facets of migration are 
needed to be analysed in order to understand the relationship between the welfare state and 
immigration, especially when it comes to the association between the welfare generosity of a 
country and the choices of the destinations of immigrants. For instance, a more dynamic model 
to explain this relationship can be the migrant network theory. It explains the decision-making 
process of migrants’ choices of destinations beyond the quantity of countries’ degree of welfare 
generosity. ‘Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that link together migrants, former 
migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through the bonds of kinship, 
friendship and shared community origin’ (Massey, 1990, p. 69). By having a certain degree of 
networks among people, migrants can reduce their risk and cost of moving to such a new place 
since exiting migrant networks can help to direct the newcomers to reach professions or 
accommodation more easily and securely. Moreover, it cannot be neglected that information 
that migrants could gain through their social networks can be a crucial part of determining the 
destination country. For example, a study by Tabor, Milfont, and Ward (2015) indicates that 
migrants’ decision upon their destinations is made by different information, such as safety, 
opportunity (for better employment), and cultural similarity and so on. Consequently, the 
migrant network, which is ‘the flow of the reciprocal exchange of goods, services, and 
economically valuable information’ (Lomnitz, 1976, p. 137 as cited in Gurak & Caces, 1992, 
p. 154), facilitates and attracts additional movements of people.  
‘It is also possible that the relationship highlighted by the welfare magnet theory is 
endogenous, with the composition of immigrant groups or policy changes in reaction to 
immigration altering unemployment benefit spending’ (Giulietti, Guzi, Kahanec, & 
Zimmermann, 2013 as cited in Soroka, Johnston, Kevins, Banting, & Kymlicka, 2016). Razin, 
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Sadka, and Suwankiri (2011) comprehensively approach to the question of the welfare state 
and immigration by analysing the relationship between the generosity of the welfare state and 
the skill composition of immigrants. According to authors, in a broad sense, welfare generosity 
attracts immigrants as the welfare magnet hypothesis suggests; however, it attracts mostly 
unskilled immigrants who are considered as welfare beneficiaries rather than contributors. 
Moreover, they also highlight the importance of taking into account different migrant regimes 
as the relationship between the welfare state and immigration can be depended upon the 
migration policy or regime. ‘[T]he welfare magnet hypothesis is only expected in free-
migration regimes, where migrants are free to self-select. [...because] in a managed-migration 
regime [or restricted migration regime] [...], demand for immigrants would favour the high 
skilled net contributors to the welfare system’ (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 10).  
 
5.2 Multilevel linear regression models 
 
5.2.1 Main effect: inflows of immigrants upon different policy areas.  
 
 This paper utilises the multilevel linear regression models in order the analyse the 
relation between the inflows of immigrants and people’s support for the welfare state as the 
main effect. These multilevel linear regression models (table 2, 3, and 4) look at different social 
policies respectively within the field of social insurance (pension and unemployment policy) 
and social investment (childcare policy) in relation to the inflows of immigrants. These tables 
display different models of the effect of inflows of immigrants upon each policy area in the 
year of 2008 and 2016. Hence, each table is divided by different years: models 1, 2, and 3 
concerning the year of 2008, while models 4, 5, and 6 are in the year of 2016. Each table’s 
model 1 and 4 indicate merely the effect of inflows of immigrants upon each policy area. 
Individual-level controls are included in model 2 and 5, while Model 3 and 6 includes 
individual-level controls together with country-level controls. Full versions of each table can 
be found in the appendix.   
 Firstly, table 2 particularly looks at the pension policy. Model 1 and model 2 
demonstrate the effects of relative inflows of immigrants in 2008 could lead to less support of 
people for the pension policy. However, they are neither statistically significant nor 
substantively significant with the inclusion of individual-level controls. When country-level 
controls are introduced alongside the individual controls as shown in Model 3, the effect is 
positive and gets statistically significant, yet the effect size remains relatively weak. In 2016, 
the effect sizes are both statistically and substantively significant as they are relatively higher 
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compared to 2008 in Model 4 and 5. They can be translated as the inflows of immigrants into 
a country undermine people’s support for the pension policy. A country like Germany that 
experienced over 2 percent of relative inflows of immigrants can have a substantive outcome. 
However, they do not include country-level controls. The inclusion of both individual and 
country controls in 2016 renders the main effect marginally significant (p=0.094) with its 
diminished effect size.   
 
 
Table 3. Multilevel Linear Regression Models for the relative inflows of immigrants upon people's 
support for the welfare state in terms of Unemployment policy in 2008 and 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2016 2016 2016 
Relative inflows of 
immigrants 0.0225 -0.0173 0.165 -0.253 -0.291 -0.292 
 (0.185) (0.182) (0.225) (0.213) (0.224) (0.249) 
Individual level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Class dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 6.766*** 6.824*** 9.950 6.843*** 6.647*** -0.979 
 (0.209) (0.257) (6.016) (0.215) (0.261) (5.857) 
N 25283 25283 25283 24565 24565 24565 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Full version in Appendix 
Table 2. Multilevel Linear Regression Models for the relative inflows of immigrants upon 
people's support for the welfare state in terms of Pension policy in 2008 and 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2016 2016 2016 
Relative inflows of 
immigrants -0.128 -0.130 0.249* -0.456** -0.492** -0.281 
 (0.153) (0.150) (0.110) (0.157) (0.159) (0.168) 
Individual level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Class dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 8.485*** 8.523*** 14.24*** 8.444*** 8.461*** -0.395 
 (0.173) (0.212) (2.948) (0.159) (0.188) (3.961) 
N 25283 25283 25283 24565 24565 24565 




 Table 3 displays the main effects of relative inflows of immigrants in relation to the 
people’s support for the unemployment policy. In both years of 2008 and 2016, most of the 
results suggest that the main effect stays as negative, but the effect size is even smaller 
compared to the pension policy. They are neither statistically nor marginally significant, which 
can demonstrate more or less no relation between the inflows of immigrants and people’s 
support for the unemployment policy at the national level in both years of 2008 and 2016. The 
effect sizes also show that they are not substantively significant. Furthermore, table 4 regarding 
the childcare policy displays that when the model includes the country level controls the main 
effect leads to more support of people towards the policy, whereas other models show the 
opposite case. However, it shares similar findings as the unemployment policy. There are no 
statistically significant effects of inflows of immigrants upon the childcare policy across 
different models and years. Only model 6 reports the substantively significant effect size.  
 The above findings suggest the mixed results of the main effect in relation to the three 
different policy areas. It appears to be the case that there are no clear patterns across different 
policy areas. The main effects of inflows of immigrants at the national level did not have a 
much of impact upon the people’s support for the unemployment and childcare policy, while 
it shows a tendency of having a negative effect on the pension policy. Therefore, only the 
pension policy seems to confirm the first hypothesis, which is posited as ‘inflows of immigrants 
can possibly undermine the people’s support for the welfare state and its social policy (H1). 
Furthermore, this different results of three policies demonstrate that ‘[t]he welfare state is an 
umbrella term covering a range of governmental activities that have distinctive characteristics’ 
Table 4. Multilevel Linear Regression Models for the relative inflows of immigrants upon people's 
support for the welfare state in terms of Childcare policy in 2008 and 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2016 2016 2016 
Relative inflows of immigrants -0.249 -0.258 0.0183 -0.201 -0.103 0.497 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.258) (0.273) (0.285) (0.310) 
Individual level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Class dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 7.880*** 8.178*** 7.303 7.975*** 8.052*** 7.001 
 (0.236) (0.290) (6.900) (0.276) (0.326) (7.286) 
N 25283 25283 25283 24565 24565 24565 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Full version in Appendix 
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(Pierson, 2001, p. 11). It implies that each policy area of the welfare state differently 
experiences the effect of inflows of immigrants. These results induce to two questions that are 
related to the main effect. First, why only the pension policy experiences the effect of the 
inflows of immigrants compared to unemployment and childcare policy? Secondly, in the case 
of pension policy, what is a possible explanation for the change of the effect size of inflows of 
immigrants between the years of 2008 and 2016?  
The question of why the pension policy experiences the effect of inflows of immigrants, 
whereas the unemployment and childcare policy do not experience the effect can be explained 
partly due to the pension policy being considered as ‘the established central pillars of the 
welfare state on which the financial stability of the entire regime ultimately depends’ 
(Häusermann, Kurer, & Traber, 2019, p. 1063). Thus, the proponents of pension policy have 
well-established and strong interest groups with a broad number of supporters who are more 
concerned with the effect of the inflows of immigrants. Moreover, people may prioritise a 
certain social policy in contrast to other policies. As it is observable from table 2, 3, and 4, the 
constants of table 1 that deals with the pension policy are relatively higher than table 3 and 4. 
Hence, it can be interpreted as people might prioritise the pension policy over others. This can 
be understood in the context of the dynamics of the politics of the welfare state. Together with 
Pierson’s (1996; 2001) emphasis on the new politics of welfare state as the politics of welfare 
retrenchment and the literature of changing welfares state. It shows the complex relationship 
between the emergence of new social risks that welfare states have to adapt and change its 
social policies through reforms, and the fiscal and political pressure within the welfare states 
to balance its expenditure. Consequently, Häusermann et al (2019) describe the today’s welfare 
politics as ‘politics of trade-offs’ because of ‘the context of contemporary welfare politics 
resembles a zero-sum distributive game in which gains for some social groups come at the 
expense of other groups’ (Häusermann et al, 2019, p. 1088). This leaves a great implication on 
how to understand people’s support or preference for certain social policies. Therefore, 
‘[p]ositions (i.e. whether one generally supports the provision of a welfare benefit) lose 
relevancy at the expense of priorities (i.e. if the welfare state – because of finite resources – 
can only include some policies and cater for some needs but not others, which policies and 
needs one would prioritize over others)’ (Enggist, 2019, p. 3).  
The comparison between different years of the main effect within the pension policy 
shows that the effect size gets relatively bigger from 2008 to 2016. One of the hypothetical 
explanations could be that the increased inflows of immigrants in 2016 compare to 2008 had 
led to an increased size effect. This research utilises the method of difference in differences, 
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which mimics the treatment effect of the experiment that can be helpful to understand the 
causality. Therefore, countries were divided into a control group that does not experience the 
increased inflows of immigrants and treatment group, which includes countries do experience 
the increased inflows of immigrants. Figure 3 demonstrates both groups experience the 
negative effect of inflows of immigrants over the time period from 2008 to 2016. However, it 
does not prove the point that the increased inflows of immigrants possibly can lead to the more 
negative support on the pension policy as the two groups’ graphic lines are almost parallel in 
before and after the intervention. Otherwise, the line of treatment group would have followed 
the hypothetical dashed line where it would indicate that the increased inflows of immigrants 
would lead to more negative support for the pension policy.  
 
Figure 3. Graph of difference in differences upon the pension policy. 
 
 
If the increased inflows of immigrants are not the possible explanation to the increased 
effect size in 2016, another explanation could be considered under the context of the shifted 
images of immigrants between two different periods. Considering the countries in this research 
are mostly European countries excluding Israel, in the year 2008 many European countries 
experienced the European Union’s (EU) eastern enlargement process between the years of 
2004 and 2005. This eastern enlargement of the EU was one of the biggest expansion processes 
in terms of both population and territory by accepting ten central and eastern European 
countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Latvia. According to a study of 






















the EU’s enlargement process shows that most of the European people were in favour and 
supportive for the eastern enlargement to integrate post-communist European countries into 
EU. ‘A flash Eurobarometer survey from 2009 […] indicates that a majority of the EU citizens 
agree that the enlargement has contributed to the free movement of people on the continent, 
offered good business opportunities for Western companies […] and better living standards in 
[Central and Eastern Europe]’ (Toshkov et al., 2014, p. 8). However, they also reveal that 
public opinion has become hostile towards the future enlargement process of the EU over time. 
As several studies mention, one of the main determinants for the decreased support for the 
further European enlargement process is the national identity and perceived cultural threat (de 
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). Some parts of people start to question the presence of the EU 
in their nation-state with a growing fear of losing their national identity, culture, and political 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, these are considered as the reactions towards the EU, it is possible 
to assume that there has been growing fear of the influx of new people or fear of immigration 
across different countries. From 2015 with the refugee crisis in Europe, the image of 
immigrants shifted from the possible immigrants from European countries with shared history 
to immigrants with very much of different cultural backgrounds who are often depicted as a 
threat to natives. This shift did not solely take a place through individuals’ simple change of 
their minds, but it is rather projected through political parties. Several studies show the 
importance of role of the elite including political parties in the process of formulating public 
opinion. As Zaller (1990; 1991) argues that ‘if the messages coming from all political parties 
and political elites are supportive of a particular policy, then politically aware individuals will 
come to incorporate these preferences into their own belief systems’ (Mclaren, 2001, p. 87). 
Consequently, as many of far-right political parties are characterised with anti-immigrant and 
ethno-nationalistic xenophobia, the re-emergence of radical right-wing parties in many 
European countries in the past decade has facilitated the shift of image of immigrants. For 
instance, ‘[r]adical right-wing parties have framed immigrants as problems because they are: a 
threat to the national identity; a major cause of criminality and social unrest; a cause of 
unemployment; and abusers of the welfare state’ (Rydgren, 2008, p. 739). Hence, this shifted 
image of immigrants can be helpful and be a possible explanation to understand the different 
effect sizes of inflows of immigrants between the years of 2008 and 2016, especially in relation 
to the pension policy.  
 
5.2.2 Estimating possible mechanism 1: solidarity effect 
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 Merely considering the main effect at the aggregated or national level as the analysis 
of the main effect can raise a question of whether or not the effect of inflows of immigrants 
upon the people’s support for the social policy can be differently interpreted according to 
different social positions or groups. Consequently, two possible mechanisms that can link the 
macro-level of inflows of immigrants to the individual level of welfare attitude of people are 
proposed in this research: solidarity and perceived risk effects. The solidarity effect attempts 
to integrate the levels of interpersonal trust into the main effect in order to find out the questions 
of if different levels of interpersonal trust of people can drive to different interpretations of the 
inflows of immigrants and low level of trust is related to the heterogeneity of society that might 
undermine the welfare state or social policy.  
Figure 4 represents the different graphical models of marginal plots for the people’s 
support for the pension, unemployment benefit, and childcare policies with the inclusion of the 
interaction effects between the inflows of immigrants and different levels of interpersonal trust. 
The graphs are the results of both including the individual and country-level control variables. 
For simplicity, the graphs show merely two different levels of interpersonal trust from the ten 
scales: you can’t be too careful (lowest trust level) and most people can be trusted (highest trust 
level). The term more supportive or less supportive in the analysis are used as relative terms.   
 
 
Figure 4. Marginal effects of interaction between inflows of immigrants and the levels of 
interpersonal trust upon pension, unemployment, and childcare policy in the year of 2008 and 
2016. 
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3. Childcare (left: 2008, right: 2016) 
 
 
First, in terms of the pension policy, the marginal plots from figure 4 show that people 
tend to be more supportive of the pension policy with the inflows of immigrants regardless of 
the different levels of interpersonal trust in 2008. However, the interaction effects between 
inflows of immigrants and different levels of trusts turn out to be not statistically significant. 
In 2016, there is a decline of people’s supports for the pension policy regarding both two levels 
of trust. The interaction effects become statistically significant in the aftermath of the relative 
inflows of immigrants reach the level of 1 percent. People with the highest trust seem to react 
more to the increasing inflows of immigrants compared to the very low trust group as the 
highest trust group’s effect size seems bigger in 2016.  
Second, in 2008 the policy for unemployment demonstrates the mixed results. The 
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for the lowest trust group. However, as the case of pension policy in 2008, the interaction 
effects of both trust levels with inflows of immigrants appear to be not statistically significant. 
However, in 2016 the interaction effects appear to be statistically significant across different 
levels of trust groups and levels of relative inflows of immigrants. As shown in the margins 
plots in figure 4, people are inclined to be less supportive towards of the unemployment policy 
in 2016, especially the people with the lowest trust level. In both cases of pension and 
unemployment policy, people are supporting less towards each policy regardless of different 
levels of trust. These interaction effects are statistically significant in the year 2016, whereas 
they are not in 2008. 
As interaction effects are merely significant in the year 2016, this analysis focus on 
the results of different effect sizes in 2016. Under the condition of no inflows of immigrants, 
the highest and lowest level of trust groups share similar support of both the pension and 
unemployment policy. However, their support diverges as inflows of immigrant increases. In 
terms of the pension policy, the highest trust group shows the relatively bigger effect size 
compare to the lowest trust group. For the unemployment policy, it is the reversed case since 
the lowest trust group demonstrates the relatively bigger effect size than the highest trust group. 
Furthermore, these results disagree with the study of Ervasti and Hjerm (2012) that investigates 
the effect of the number of immigrants in countries on the various dependent variables such as 
interpersonal trust and welfare chauvinism. One of their main findings is that ‘[s]ocietal trust 
does have a positive effect in that people tend to be more pro the welfare state in high trust 
societies’ (Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012, p. 165). However, as figure 4 demonstrates it is not always 
the case that people with the highest level of interpersonal trust necessarily have the pro-
welfare state attitude since the increasing level of inflows of immigrants can possibly lead the 
people with the highest trust to be less supportive in the case of pension. 
The main effect of inflows of immigrants manifests that people tend to be less 
supportive in the case of pension policy in 2016. Moreover, the main effect and analysis of 
different levels of trust group share a similar picture that people’s level of support for certain 
social policies declines and becomes statistically significant from 2008 to 2016. However, the 
above findings reveal the importance of including different social groups to understand the 
effect of inflows of immigrants as the different social groups experience the macro-level 
inflows of immigrants respectively, but also at the same time it raises a question of why they 
differ one from each other. 
One of the possible explanations can be how respondents possibly perceived the 
questions of the pension and unemployment policy. In other words, respondents might have 
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perceived the pension policy that is more future-oriented welfare benefits, while the 
unemployment policy that can be shown more of a benefit in present. This discussion derives 
from the Häusermann et al.'s (2019) argument of the today’s politics of welfare state as “politics 
of trade-offs”. ‘In general, the trade-off between social investments and passive social transfers 
is often depicted as one between policies that create diffuse benefits at some point in the future 
vs social policies that have concrete benefits in the present’ (Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017, 
p. 875; Streeck & Mertens, 2011). However, this research suggests that this trade-off can be 
applied within the same dimension of social policy and not necessarily between different 
dimensions like social insurance and social investment. One of the findings of Ervasti and 
Hjerm (2012) is that there is a positive relationship between the level of trust and education. 
Consequently, people with the lowest trust level can be associated with a lesser level of 
education, which implies that they experience the low level of income as well (Gregorio & Lee, 
2002). Thus, it is possible that a low level of trust group is more concerned with the benefits 
that they can get in the present such as unemployment benefits rather in the vague future 
benefits like pension. Reversely, as the higher interpersonal trust level can be referred to the 
higher level of education, people with the highest trust level are more concerned with the 
future-oriented welfare benefits rather than benefits in presents. Hence, this can explain the 
bigger interaction effect size of the lowest trust group when the unemployment policy is 
considered with the inflows of immigrants, while it is the smaller interaction effect size upon 
the pension policy in comparison to the highest trust group. It appears to be the opposite case 
that the highest interpersonal trust level has a bigger interaction effect size when it comes to 
the pension policy and it has the smaller effect size upon the unemployment policy in 
comparison to the lowest trust group.  
Third, the case of childcare policy reports different results from both pension and 
unemployment policy. Figure 4 shows that in the year 2008, people with the lowest trust level 
tend to be less supportive towards the childcare policy with increasing inflows of immigrants, 
whereas people with the highest trust level are more supportive. Their effect sizes seem not 
substantively significant as their changes of support are minors at different levels of inflows of 
immigrants. Furthermore, interactions of both two levels of trust level with inflows of 
immigrants are not statistically significant. In the case of 2016, people with both of two 
different levels of interpersonal trust are inclined to be more supportive of the childcare policy 
with the increasing inflows of immigrants. But the interactions are not statistically significant 
in 2016 as well.  
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In sum, the results of the effect of solidarity demonstrate that there are variations of 
outcomes across different years and specific policies. Different levels of interpersonal trust 
manifest the different effect sizes upon each policy area. Overall, for the pension and 
unemployment policy, there is a general direction of people being less supportive towards each 
policy and interactions are statistically significant in 2016, while different levels of 
interpersonal trust with inflows of immigrants are neither statistically nor substantive 
significant in terms of effect sizes in 2008. More specifically, people with higher trust tend to 
be less supportive of the pension policy with inflows of immigrants than people with a lower 
level of trust. People with the lowest trust tend to be less supportive of the unemployment 
policy with inflows of immigrants. In the case of childcare policy, it merely shows the potential 
directions of the effects of inflows of immigrants since both years of interactions between 
different levels of trust and inflows of immigrants are not statistically significant. It shows that 
in 2016 people are supportive of the childcare policy with increasing inflows of immigrants, 
whereas there are not much of the interaction effects of inflows of immigrants and the different 
levels of trust in 2008. In terms of the anti-solidarity argument, it can be said that inflows of 
immigrants do not necessarily make people with the lowest level of trust to be less supportive 
towards social policies. Consequently, Hypothesis 1a (H1a) only confirms the case of 
unemployment policy in 2016.  
5.2.3 Estimating possible mechanism 2: perceived risk effect  
 
 For the perceived risk effect, the research includes the different occupation-based 
social classes of individuals since the different social class positions of individuals can either 
reinforce or undermine the people’s support for the social policy with the experience of inflows 
of immigrants. Thus, this analysis would reveal that not only whether or not inflows of 
immigrants can possibly undermine people’s support for social policies in line with the 
prospect theory, but also how the effect of inflows of immigrants can be translated differently 
to the welfare attitudes through the occupation-based social class. Albeit this research includes 
all the 8 class positions for the multilevel linear regression models, for simplicity its analysis 
merely included three different classes: (associated) managers, socio-cultural (semi-) 
professionals, and production workers.  
Figure 5 represents the graphs of marginal effects of interactions between inflows of 
immigrants and the three different occupation-based social class in terms of the pension, 
unemployment, and childcare policy respectively in both years of 2008 and 2016. The marginal 
plots’ multilevel linear regression models both include individual and country control variables. 
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The analysis will firstly look at the pension followed by the unemployment policy and the 
childcare policy. Each analysis investigates the differences within the new middle classes and 
differences between manual and non-manual classes. The term more supportive or less 
supportive in the analysis is relative terms as well.  
 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effects of interaction between inflows of immigrants and the different 
occupation-based social class positions upon pension, unemployment, and childcare policy in 
the year of 2008 and 2016. 
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In terms of the pension policy in 2008 from figure 5, there are many variations and 
differences across different occupations. The differences between managers and socio-cultural 
professionals are statistically significant from the level of inflows of immigrants at 0.5 percent 
to onwards. However, theses difference turns out to be very small and their effect sizes report 
that they are not substantively significant. The differences between production workers as 
manual, and managers and socio-cultural professionals as non-manual skilled occupations 
demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference only between production workers 
and managers. This difference only appears to be statistically significant when the level of 
relative inflows of immigrants are between 0 to 2 percent. However, the differences and their 
effect sizes are not substantively significant as well. In 2016, the results show more dynamic 
variations across the occupation groups. In general, all three groups show a tendency of being 
less supportive of the pension policy with increasing inflows of immigrants. The difference 
between managers and socio-cultural professionals are statistically significant only after the 
level of inflows of immigrants reach 1 percent. Furthermore, the production workers and the 
new middle classes show that they are also statistically significantly different from each other 
after the inflows of immigrants reach 1 percent. The effect sizes and differences across 
occupation groups are substantively significant compared to the year of 2008.  
As differences across occupation groups and interaction effect sizes vary rather in 2016 
than 2008, the following discussion is focused on the year of 2016. The differences between 
the production workers and managers are relatively bigger than between production workers 
and socio-cultural professionals. Moreover, the effect size appears to be bigger in relation to 



















0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
relative inflows of immigrants (%) 2007
Production workers
(Associate) managers Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals



















0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
relative inflows of immigrants (%) 2015
Production workers
(Associate) managers Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals
Predictive Margins of occupations with 95% CIs
 50 
that managers tend to be less supportive of the pension policy compared to the other two 
occupations with inflows of immigrants. Interestingly, these findings report that production 
workers who are assumed to have a higher degree of perceived risk are not the occupation 
group with the bigger interaction effect size than other groups. Thus, this implies the higher 
degree of the perceived risk of production workers does not necessarily lead to a less supportive 
welfare attitude towards the pension. 
Instead of the level of perceived risk, what might be accountable to these differences 
between the new middle classes is the attached (political) value orientations to these 
occupations. Kriesi (1998) distinguishes these two classes according to the value orientations 
that are developed by Kitschelt (1994). He predicts that managers to “right-authoritarian” that 
refers to people who ‘prefer market solutions and free exchange and to have an idea of 
community which is more authoritarian, paternalistic and organization-centered’ (Kriesi, 1998, 
p. 169), while he expects socio-cultural professionals to be “left-libertarians”, who are 
‘supposed to have both a postmaterialist or socially liberal outlook and to support a classic 
social-democratic position with respect to economic policy and the welfare state’ (Kriesi, 1998, 
p. 169). Consequently, the interaction bigger effect size of managers than socio-cultural 
professionals, and the bigger differences between production workers and managers in 
comparison to differences between production workers and socio-cultural professionals reflect 
Kriesi’s (1998) expectations. Managers who are interested in the issues associated with 
‘authoritarian socio-cultural governance structures’ (Kitschelt, 2004, p. 10), such as the cultural 
homogeneity, which can lead to the anti-immigrant sentiment and eventually the restrain on 
the social policy, whereas social-cultural professionals are not.  
Second, in terms of the unemployment policy in figure 5, in 2008 the differences 
between new middle classes are statistically significant at all levels of inflows of immigrants. 
The new middle classes tend to be more supportive of the unemployment policy, especially 
socio-cultural professionals are relatively more supportive than managers. When it comes to 
the comparison between manual and non-manual skilled classes, merely the difference between 
production workers and managers display a statistically significant difference. In this case, 
production workers are more supportive than managers towards the unemployment policy. 
However, these differences are not substantively significant as their effect sizes are weak. In 
2016, the differences between managers and socio-cultural professionals are still significantly 
different, yet this difference appears to be smaller than in 2008. Socio-cultural professionals 
are still more supportive of the unemployment policy than managers. Furthermore, the division 
between manual and non-manual classes here reports a mixed results since differences between 
 51 
production workers and managers are statistically significant when the level of inflows of 
immigrants is in between 0 to 1.5 percent, whereas differences between production workers 
and socio-cultural professionals are statistically significant when there is 1.5 percent of relative 
inflows of immigrants or higher than 1.5 percent. In other words, the socio-cultural 
professionals more responsive to the inflows of immigrants when there is a relatively higher 
degree of inflows of immigrants. The managers are more responsive when there is a lower level 
of inflows of immigrants. But they both tend to be less supportive of the unemployment policy. 
Here as well, the interaction effects can be considered as not substantively significant. 
In terms of effect sizes in 2016, albeit it is not very substantively significant, the 
production workers show a relatively bigger interaction effect size than others. As 
unemployment policy is more directly related to the labour market, the economically 
vulnerable positions of production workers might have led to this bigger interaction effect 
towards the unemployment policy. As Naumann, Buss, and Bähr (2016) argue that individuals’ 
attitudes are shaped by self-interest, thus one’s experience of unemployment changes 
individuals’ welfare attitudes to increased support for unemployment benefits. In addition, 
immigrants coming to the European countries might have a narrow range of job that is often 
understood as lower-skilled works. ‘For instance, the proportion of the working-age foreign-
born population with lower than upper secondary education averages 35% for the EU-25, 
almost 10 percentage points higher than the 25% for the native population’ (OCED, 2009 as 
cited in Burgoon et al., 2012, p. 292). Hence, as production workers can be more exposed to 
the immigrants in their workplaces, they can possibly feel more threatened or they have a 
higher degree of the perceived risk of losing their job than other two groups. The case of 
unemployment policy reveals that the different perceived of risk might matter unlike the case 
of pension policy. Furthermore, the different value orientations between socio-cultural 
professionals and managers could have led to a different level of support as socio-cultural 
professionals tend to be more supportive than managers. 
Third, the childcare policy demonstrates a different picture from the pension and 
unemployment policy. In 2008, the inflows of immigrants do not influence the people’s support 
for the childcare policy across different occupations as shown in figure 5. The difference 
between new middle classes turn out to be statistically significant, yet they are not substantively 
significant. Socio-cultural professionals show a tendency of being more supportive of the 
childcare policy than the managers. Moreover, the comparison between production workers 
and managers appear to be statistically significant, while the differences between production 
workers and socio-cultural professionals are not statistically significant. Production workers 
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are less supportive than managers towards the childcare policy, yet these differences are not 
very substantively significant as their effect sizes are quite small. In 2016, the differences 
between managers and socio-cultural professionals are statistically significant when inflows of 
immigrants are between 0.5 and 2 percent, yet the differences remain relatively small. They 
both show a tendency of being more supportive of the childcare policy with increasing inflows 
of immigrants. The difference between manual and non-manual classes show only the 
significant difference between production workers and managers when the inflows of 
immigrants is in between 0 to 0.5. They tend to be more supportive with increasing inflows of 
immigrants.  
The comparison between production workers and managers even at the relatively low 
level of inflows of immigrants displays that, as it is assumed, production workers with relative 
higher perceived risk do not necessarily lead to less support of childcare policy than managers. 
Nonetheless, socio-cultural professionals and managers share similar effect sizes, socio-
cultural professionals are more supportive than managers. As mentioned beforehand, Kriesi 
(1998) expects the socio-cultural professionals to be left-libertarians, who are generally more 
supportive of the welfare state. Particularly, with the childcare policy, socio-cultural 
professionals can show a relative bigger support because as argued by Kitschelt, they ‘tend to 
advocate a retrenchment of spending on the current generation of the elderly (pay-go pension 
benefits, health care and even unemployment insurance) so as to dedicate resources to human 
capital investments in the young (improved education and university training, public childcare)’ 
(Kitschelt, 2004, p. 6).  
The above analyses indicate that the effect of inflows of immigrants upon different 
social policies varies across occupation groups. The general direction shows that in the case of 
the pension and unemployment policies, managers, socio-cultural professionals, and 
production workers tend to be less supportive in the year of 2016 than in 2008 with the inflows 
of immigrants. Albeit the findings are neither statistically nor substantively significant, it is the 
opposite case in relation to the childcare policy, in which all three occupations show more 
supportive with inflows of immigrants. The results of 2016 appear to be more substantively 
significant than 2008. The differences between new middle classes show they are statistically 
significant across the social policies, yet the differences remain small. The manager appears to 
be less supportive than socio-cultural professionals for the pension and unemployment policy. 
The comparison between manual and non-manual skilled occupations report that manual 
skilled occupation like production workers are more attentive to unemployment policy with 
inflows of immigrants, whereas non-manual skilled occupations are more concerned with the 
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pension policy. Furthermore, findings imply that the degree of perceived risk only appears to 
be a matter in terms of unemployment policy in 2016. Consequently, hypothesis 1b (H1b) 
merely confirms in the case of unemployment policy in 2016. Furthermore, the value 
orientations or pre-existing political ideology of different occupations as argued by Kriesi 
(1998) and Kitschelt (1994; 2004) partly captures the dynamics of the welfare attitdues of 
people.  
5.3 Difference between social insurance and social investment   
 As this research attempts to distinguish different dimensions of the welfare state and 
its social policies, the pension and unemployment policies are chosen to represent the social 
insurance policy dimension, and childcare policy for the social investment policy dimension. 
It appears to be the case, in terms of the main effect, that the inflows of immigrants show a 
tendency of negatively influence the pension policy, whereas the other two policies are not 
substantively and statistically significant. Findings also reveal that the main effect 
demonstrates a significant degree of variations of outcomes across different models, years and 
policies. Consequently, within the given representations of each dimension, the differences 
between social insurance and social investment might not be very clear. When the analysis 
takes into account the different levels of interpersonal trust and different occupations in order 
to figure out how solidarity and perceived risk effects play roles, the differences between the 
social insurance and social investment becomes more visible. Nonetheless, the different levels 
of trust and occupations turn out to be not statistically significant in the case of social 
investment policy, it provides a general direction of how social investment differ from the 
social insurance policy. Overall, general directions show that there are relatively more 
supportive attitudes for social insurance and not much of effect in terms of social investment 
in 2008. However, in 2016 people tend to be less supportive towards social insurance policies 
and supportive of the social investment across different levels of trust and different occupations. 
Also, their effect sizes are substantively significant in comparison to the year of 2008. 
Therefore, a meaningful comparison between social insurance and social investment 
dimensions of social policy can be drawn from the year of 2016. 
 In 2016, social insurance policies (pension and unemployment policy) suggest an 
efficacy hypothesis as people show a tendency of being less supportive with inflows of 
immigrants. In terms of the social investment policy (childcare policy), the results suggest the 
compensation hypothesis as people are inclined to be more supportive with inflows of 
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immigrants. In other words, the social investment policy that is aiming to prepare people 
against social risks is more popular than the social insurance policy with the increasing inflows 
of immigrants. These findings display that there are differences between social insurance and 
social investment regarding how inflows of immigrants affect people’s support for each social 
policy. However, these analyses consider each policy area separately from each other. If 
contemporary politics of the welfare state is politics of trade-offs (Häusermann et al., 2019), 
the remaining question is how people change their support towards each social policy 
dimension when they are asked in terms of trade-off questions such as one’s support of one 
policy area at the expense of another area.  
 Figure 6 shows the coefficient plot of the effect of inflows of immigrants upon the 
trade-off question between unemployment benefits and education policy in 2016. 
Unemployment benefits represents the social insurance dimension and education policy 
represents the social investment dimension. The result shows that people do not prefer the 
welfare state to spend money on education at the cost of unemployment benefit. In other words, 
people prefer a social insurance than a social investment when the trade-off question is 
considered. This confirms previous studies which demonstrate that ‘social investments are 
popular, but this popularity has limits’ (Neimanns, Busemeyer, & Garritzmann, 2018, p. 250; 
Busemeyer & Garritzmann, 2017). However, albeit the effect of inflows of immigrants is 
statistically significant, the effect size appears to be not substantively significant. Hence, it is 
still questionable to what extent people prefer social insurance over social investment policies.  
 
Figure 6. Coefficient plot of inflows of immigrants upon trade-off question between 






There has been an increasing number of international migrations on a global scale. At 
the same time, the acceleration of far-right public discourse within many societies raises the 
question of the immigration. Migration does not merely bear individual for the immigrants, but 
also carries political and social consequences in both the countries of origin and destination. 
One of the salient political and social consequences of migration can be considered to be as the 
issues concerning the welfare state. The welfare state is designed as an inclusive mechanism 
to ensure that nobody is left behind. However, the welfare state might also function as an 
exclusive mechanism as questions arise with the relationship between immigration and the 
welfare state. 
Recent literature shows inconclusive empirical findings regarding the issue. On the 
one hand, scholars support the efficiency hypothesis agrees with Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) 
the generic hypothesis. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) contend that the increasing levels of inflows 
of immigrants can undermine the welfare state and people’s support for social policies. This 
argument is followed by different scholars who argue that immigrants are considered as “them” 
or outsiders in the context of social and national identity (Luttmer, 2001); or often conceived 
as the least deserving social group for the welfare benefits (van Oorschot, 2006). This negative 
effect of immigration upon people’s support for the welfare state and social policies appears to 
be salient at the different levels, such as at the national and region levels (Eger, 2010; Breznau 
& Eger, 2016). On the other hand, other scholars bring forth the compensation hypothesis 
which argues immigrants, in fact, reinforce the people’s support for the welfare state (Brady & 
Finnigan, 2014; Goldschmidt, 2015). Many studies that suggest the compensation hypothesis 
show that factors such as perceived risks or threats caused by the inflows of immigrants render 
people to be more protected through the welfare state. ‘While perceptions of immigrant threat 
are central to the generic and chauvinistic hypotheses, [...] it also plays a potentially positive 
role in increasing support for the redistribution’ (Kwon & Curran, 2016, p. 380). Consequently, 
this research examines the relationship between the welfare state and immigration. More 
specifically, it aims to understand the effect of inflows of immigrants on people’s support for 
different social policies. 
The results of the descriptive analysis, which tests the relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state demonstrate that there is no such relationship between 
relative inflows of immigrants and the level of generosity of the welfare state. Consequently, 
this finding suggests taking different factors such as social networks or migrant policies into 
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account to understand the immigration-welfare state nexus. Moreover, the main effect 
examines the effect of inflows of immigrants on three different social policies in 2008 and 
2016. The findings of the main effect show a tendency that the inflows of immigrants only 
undermine people’s support for the pension policy. In other words, the inflows of immigrants 
at the national level suggest the efficiency hypothesis since they lead to lesser support of people 
for the pension policy. Considering the unemployment and childcare policies, the results turn 
out to be statistically not significant. This can be understood as people are more concerned with 
the issues regarding the pension policy at the national level with the inflows of immigrants. 
Hence, hypothesis 1 (H1) only confirms in the case of the pension policy.  
Previous studies on the welfare attitudes mainly focus on individual determinants like 
material self-interest or non-material factors, such as norms. This research includes two 
different mechanisms that add dynamic perspectives to the understanding of the immigration-
welfare state nexus: solidarity and perceived risk effect. Moreover, it allows this research to 
comprehend the different experiences of different social groups rather than the national level 
effect. 
 The solidarity effect proposes that people’s interpersonal trust can influence the 
welfare attitude formations of people. The anti-solidarity argument suggests that migration-led 
heterogeneity within a society will lead to a lower level of interpersonal trust among people, 
which would eventually undermine the people’s support for social policies. Consequently, the 
solidarity effect allows this research to understand whether or not the low-level trust group 
leads to less support for social policy with inflows of immigrants than another group by adding 
the people’s different levels of interpersonal trust into the main analysis. Also, it allows this 
research to analyse the different levels of trust groups’ welfare attitudes resulting from the 
different experiences of the inflows of immigrants. The findings show that in 2008 both high 
and low levels of trust groups tend to be supportive of the pension and unemployment policies, 
yet they are not statistically significant. Thus, it only implies the general directions. In 2016, 
both the pension and unemployment policy are supported less with increasing inflows of 
immigrants regardless of different levels of trust. It appears to be the case that the group with 
high-level trust is inclined to be more responsive with inflows of immigrants in terms of the 
pension policy as they support lesser with inflows of immigrants than the low-level trust group. 
When it comes to the unemployment policy, the low-level trust group shows a tendency of 
being less supportive than the high-level trust group. Hence, hypothesis 1a (H1a) is only 
confirmed in the case of unemployment policy in 2016. Moreover, it shows that a low level of 
trust might not necessarily lead to less support of the welfare state like the case of pension 
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policy. In order to understand these findings, this research suggests that people might perceive 
the difference between future-oriented welfare benefits and benefits in the present within the 
same dimensions of social policy, unlike previous studies that mainly show this differentiation 
is made between the social insurance and social investment policies. In terms of childcare 
policy, different levels of interpersonal trust turn out to be statistically not significant, which 
merely proves the directions of people being less supportive in 2008 and being more supportive 
in 2016.  
 The perceived risk effect investigates how people establish their welfare attitudes 
under the social uncertainty caused by the presence of immigrants and how the different 
perceived risks in terms of occupations matter for welfare support. This analysis mainly looks 
at the difference between new middle classes (managers and socio-cultural professionals) and 
the difference between manual and non-manual skilled occupations (production workers versus 
managers or socio-cultural professionals). In terms of the pension policy, in 2008 there are 
statistically significant differences between managers and socio-cultural professionals, and 
between production workers and managers. However, they are not substantively significant 
since their effect sizes seem to remain weak. In 2016, the differences between new middle 
classes and between manual and non-manual skilled occupations are both statistically and 
substantively significant compared to 2008. The managers turn out to be less supportive of the 
pension policy than both production workers and socio-cultural professionals. These results 
disprove the hypothesis 1b (H1b) since production workers are assumed to have a higher degree 
of perceived risk than other occupations. The occupational group of production workers do not 
show a tendency of being less supportive of the pension policy than non-manual skilled 
occupations. The case of unemployment shares a similar picture as the pension policy. In 2008, 
the differences between the new middle classes and the differences between production 
workers and managers are statistically significant but it is not significant between production 
workers and socio-cultural professionals. Moreover, their differences are not substantively 
significant. In general, all three occupations show a tendency to be more supportive. In 2016, 
the results show a variety of outcomes, the differences between socio-cultural professionals 
and managers are still statistically significant. However, the difference between production 
workers and managers is statistically significant when there is only a lower level of inflows of 
immigrants, whereas the differences between production workers and socio-cultural 
professionals are statistically significant only with a higher level of inflows of immigrants. In 
contrast to 2008, people tend to be less supportive of the unemployment policy with increasing 
inflows of immigrants in 2016. Here, the perceived risk seems to matter, thus confirming the 
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hypothesis 1b (H1b), since the production workers manifest that they are less supportive of the 
unemployment policy than manual skilled occupations with inflows of immigrants. The 
childcare policy demonstrates that there are differences between production workers and 
managers, and between new middle classes in 2008 and 2016. Yet, their differences are 
substantively not significant. The general direction shows that people are more supportive of 
childcare policy in 2016, while it is the opposite case in 2008.  
 Besides, this research attempts to fill the research gap by the inclusion of the notion of 
multidimensionality of the welfare state. Therefore, the analysis included both social insurance 
(pension and unemployment policy) and social investment policies (childcare policy). The 
findings demonstrate that there are differences between these two social policies. Albeit the 
cases of childcare policy displaying that they are not very substantively significant, people 
show a tendency of being more supportive of the social investment policy with increasing 
inflows of immigrants in 2016. In terms of social insurance policies, people are inclined to be 
less supportive. In other words, the efficiency hypothesis seems to be salient with social 
insurance policies, whereas the compensation hypothesis appears to be confirmed with the 
social investment policy. Intriguingly, when the trade-off question is considered between social 
insurance and social investment policy, people turn out to be more supportive of social 
insurance than social investment, yet the coefficient remains weak.  
The above findings imply that there truly is a dynamic relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state. Firstly, the overall results imply that European countries 
might follow the path set by Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) prediction who expect a negative 
relationship between the inflows of immigrants and people’s support for the welfare, especially 
within the context of the social insurance policy. Some scholars argue that ‘[t]he conditions 
under which diversity unfolds in Europe are quite different from the American experience. 
Institutions, levels of trust, and expectations about the role of the government are significantly 
different’ (Crepaz, 2008, p. 260 as cited in Mau & Burkhardt, 2009, p. 225). However, this 
research’s findings do not agree with the discourse of American exceptionalism in terms of the 
relationship between immigration and the welfare state. Rather, it provides substantial proof to 
argue that European countries might experience the decline of people’s support for the welfare 
state and its social policies like the U.S.  
Second, this research manifests the intricate implications of how the effect of inflows 
of immigrants can differ at the different social groups. Only taking the effect of inflows of 
immigrants into consideration at the national level might neglect the dynamics of the 
immigration-welfare nexus at different levels. The findings indicate that different levels of trust 
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and occupations show different degrees of support according to each specific social policy. 
Moreover, the differences between within the new middle classes imply that the (political) 
value orientations still can be useful to capture a dynamic of the relationship between 
immigration and the welfare state. Overall, it reveals an implication for policymakers to 
consider which social group is more attentive with what social policy under the influence of 
inflows of immigrants or who are more supportive or less supportive concerning a social policy 
with the influence of inflows of immigrants.  
Third, the significance of acknowledging the different dimensions of social policy is 
stressed in this research. Nevertheless, the several findings of social investment policy 
(childcare policy) are neither statistically nor substantively significant, they show a general 
direction that is distinctive from the social insurance policy (pension and unemployment 
policy). The results display that people can be more supportive of the social investment policy 
with inflows of immigrants than the social insurance policy. Hence, this implies the importance 
of understanding the notion of multidimensionality of the welfare state regarding the 
immigration-welfare state nexus.  
Albeit this research’s attempt to provide dynamic perspectives into the existing 
literature concerning immigration and the welfare state, it also carries on several limitations to 
this research. First of all, considering the data that is utilised in this research, the European 
Social Survey is a cross-sectional data. Nonetheless, this research analyses two different time 
periods, the data limits the understanding of immigration-welfare state nexus at the effects of 
inflows of immigrants of each year. Hence, this research is not able to analyse the changes of 
people’s welfare attitudes. Furthermore, when it comes to the distinction between social 
insurance and social investment social policy, the social investment policy is analysed within 
a limited understanding of the childcare policy. Even though the childcare policy is considered 
as one of the key policies of the social investment approach, different policies might lead to 
different results. Moreover, the different types of welfare regimes are not included in the 
analysis because ‘[i]n the influential formulation of Esping-Andersen, welfare regimes 
comprise not only state policies but also the welfare contributions of family and market’ (Kasza, 
2002, p. 272). The different welfare regimes might moderate or mediate the effect of the 
inflows of immigrants upon people’s support for the welfare state.  
Taking into account the limitations of this research, if possible, further studies should 
engage more with longitudinal data, thus overcoming the limitations of cross-sectional data. 
This would allow researchers to investigate not only the individuals’ welfare attitude changes 
but also the effect of changes in the level of inflows of immigrants. In terms of the inflows of 
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immigrants, this research does not take the different socio-economic status of immigrants into 
consideration. Further studies should consider different socio-economic characteristics of 
immigrants, which might moderate the effects of immigration upon people’s support for the 
welfare state. Moreover, it would be interesting to understand why people show different levels 
of support between non-trade-off questions and trade-off questions, especially for the 
distinction between social insurance and social investment policies. In the meantime, this 
research sheds a light on the importance of analysing the effect of immigration both at the 
national and at different social groups. Moreover, the multidimensionality of the welfare state 
is highlighted to understand the immigration-welfare state nexus. Overall, it shows that the 
issues of immigration matter for the welfare state and bears complicated implications for social 
policy. Analysing this issue given the current state of highly possible migration trends is of key 
importance of understand ways of the welfare state in our contemporary society to ensure 
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8. Appendix   
 
Table 1. Multi-level linear regression models for the pension policy in 2008 and 2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 
Relative inflows of 
immigrants -0.128 -0.130 0.249* 0.201 0.136 -0.456** -0.492** -0.281 -0.105 -0.0487 
 (0.153) (0.150) (0.110) (0.114) (0.137) (0.157) (0.159) (0.168) (0.171) (0.182) 
large employers/self-
employed 
 -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.427*** -0.275***  -0.435*** -0.436*** -0.119 -0.440*** 
  (0.0730) (0.0730) (0.119) (0.0728)  (0.0731) (0.0731) (0.126) (0.0728) 
small business 
owners 
 -0.185*** -0.186*** -0.212*** -0.176***  -0.194*** -0.195*** 0.0575 -0.199*** 
  (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0614) (0.0394)  (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0699) (0.0414) 
technical 
professionals 
 -0.211*** -0.210*** -0.311*** -0.197***  -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.0499 -0.204*** 
  (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0746) (0.0457)  (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0758) (0.0458) 
production workers Reference group 
    Reference 
group 
    
           
(assosiate) managers  -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.304*** -0.237***  -0.262*** -0.262*** 0.00828 -0.251*** 
  (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0548) (0.0365)  (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0640) (0.0392) 
Clerks  -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.209*** -0.125**  -0.182*** -0.182*** 0.0280 -0.171*** 
  (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0625) (0.0404)  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0711) (0.0433) 
socio-cultural 
professionals 
 -0.0878* -0.0876* -0.214*** -0.0702  -0.111** -0.111** 0.0120 -0.0996* 
  (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0600) (0.0405)  (0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0680) (0.0423) 
service workers  -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.118* -0.102**  -0.0464 -0.0462 0.0434 -0.0486 
  (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0490) (0.0324)  (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0592) (0.0359) 
household income   -0.0362*** -0.0361*** -0.0362*** -0.0331***  -0.0378*** -0.0378*** -0.0375*** -0.0341*** 
  (0.00437) (0.00436) (0.00436) (0.00437)  (0.00443) (0.00443) (0.00443) (0.00444) 
age  0.00327*** 0.00328*** 0.00326*** 0.00280***  0.000891 0.000887 0.00104 0.000140 
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  (0.000615) (0.000614) (0.000614) (0.000614)  (0.000645) (0.000645) (0.000645) (0.000646) 
sex  0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.120***  0.121*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.115*** 
  (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0223)  (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0235) 
education  -0.0212** -0.0212** -0.0214** -0.0198**  -0.0202*** -0.0202*** -0.0203*** -0.0193*** 
  (0.00714) (0.00714) (0.00714) (0.00712)  (0.00405) (0.00405) (0.00405) (0.00404) 
foreign-
born_individual 
 0.000272 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.152***  0.0186 0.0722** 0.0708** 0.0711** 
  (0.0133) (0.0293) (0.0296) (0.0295)  (0.0129) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0224) 
GDP per capita   0.0000108 0.0000106 0.0000108   -0.0000179* -0.0000174* -0.0000181* 
   (0.00000749) (0.00000756) (0.00000754)   (0.00000774) (0.00000772) (0.00000754) 
unemployment rate   0.0665 0.0674 0.0650   0.0203 0.0196 0.0199 
   (0.0344) (0.0347) (0.0346)   (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0170) 
human development 
index 
  -6.967 -6.839 -6.705   10.48* 10.04* 10.68* 
   (3.726) (3.762) (3.753)   (4.696) (4.684) (4.576) 
foreign-born_country   -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.200***   -0.0649* -0.0634* -0.0624* 
   (0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0408)   (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0299) 
large employers/self-
employed*inflows 
   0.171     -0.352**  
    (0.107)     (0.108)  
small business 
owners*inflows 
   0.0340     -0.299***  
    (0.0524)     (0.0660)  
technical 
professionals*inflows 
   0.125     -0.200**  





    Reference 
group 
    
           
(assosiate) 
managers*inflows 
   0.0673     -0.305***  
    (0.0489)     (0.0561)  
Clerks*inflows    0.0717     -0.246***  
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    (0.0566)     (0.0635)  
socio-cultural 
professionals*inflows 
   0.150**     -0.151*  
    (0.0527)     (0.0594)  
service 
workers*inflows 
   0.0148     -0.109  
    (0.0425)     (0.0562)  




    Reference 
group 
    
           
1     -0.378***     -0.0632 
     (0.114)     (0.137) 
2     -0.496***     -0.328** 
     (0.101)     (0.114) 
3     -0.454***     -0.392*** 
     (0.0932)     (0.101) 
4     -0.632***     -0.535*** 
     (0.0941)     (0.101) 
5     -0.625***     -0.399*** 
     (0.0864)     (0.0919) 
6     -0.914***     -0.502*** 
     (0.0923)     (0.0978) 
7     -0.707***     -0.460*** 
     (0.0902)     (0.0953) 
8     -0.470***     -0.262** 
     (0.0926)     (0.0996) 
9     -0.314**     -0.0533 
     (0.121)     (0.138) 
Most people can be 
trusted 
    -0.172     0.0677 
     (0.149)     (0.161) 
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    Reference 
group 
    
           
1*inflows     0.0927     -0.507*** 
     (0.115)     (0.146) 
2*inflows     0.0998     -0.210 
     (0.101)     (0.112) 
3*inflows     0.00813     -0.164 
     (0.0940)     (0.0982) 
4*inflows     0.103     -0.168 
     (0.0933)     (0.0968) 
5*inflows     0.127     -0.257** 
     (0.0882)     (0.0901) 
6*inflows     0.241**     -0.268** 
     (0.0924)     (0.0946) 
7*inflows     0.177     -0.235* 
     (0.0903)     (0.0917) 
8*inflows     0.0702     -0.286** 
     (0.0921)     (0.0953) 
9*inflows     -0.0283     -0.428** 
     (0.117)     (0.132) 
Most people can be 
trusted*inflows 
    -0.0112     -0.284 
     (0.143)     (0.147) 
Constant 8.485*** 8.523*** 14.24*** 14.17*** 14.58*** 8.444*** 8.461*** -0.395 -0.163 -0.197 
 (0.173) (0.212) (2.948) (2.976) (2.970) (0.159) (0.188) (3.961) (3.950) (3.859) 
N 25283 25283 25283 25283 25283 24565 24565 24565 24565 24565 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Note: each year’s model 1 includes only the explanatory variable. Model 2 with individual control variables. Model 3 with 
individual and control variables. Model 4 includes interaction effects between interpersonal trust and relative inflows of immigrants with control variables. Model 5 
includes interaction effects between occupations and relative inflows of immigrants with control variables.  
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001" 
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Table. 2 Multi-level linear regression models for the unemployment policy in 2008 and 2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 
Relative inflows of 
immigrants 0.0225 -0.0173 0.165 0.119 -0.0939 -0.253 -0.291 -0.292 -0.324 -0.354 
 (0.185) (0.182) (0.225) (0.227) (0.242) (0.213) (0.224) (0.249) (0.252) (0.255) 
large employers/self-
employed 
 -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.307* -0.349***  -0.334*** -0.335*** -0.682*** -0.387*** 
  (0.0934) (0.0934) (0.152) (0.0932)  (0.0895) (0.0895) (0.155) (0.0891) 
small business 
owners 
 -0.436*** -0.436*** -0.522*** -0.444***  -0.325*** -0.327*** -0.253** -0.356*** 
  (0.0505) (0.0505) (0.0786) (0.0504)  (0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0856) (0.0506) 
technical 
professionals 
 -0.151* -0.151* -0.248** -0.161**  -0.0947 -0.0953 -0.224* -0.122* 
  (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0955) (0.0586)  (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0929) (0.0560) 
production workers Reference group 
    Reference 
group 
    
           
(assosiate) managers  -0.286*** -0.286*** -0.311*** -0.294***  -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.234** -0.211*** 
  (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0702) (0.0468)  (0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0784) (0.0479) 
Clerks  -0.168** -0.168** -0.175* -0.160**  -0.0458 -0.0464 0.0856 -0.0636 
  (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0800) (0.0517)  (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0871) (0.0530) 
socio-cultural 
professionals 
 0.0146 0.0148 -0.0740 -0.00778  0.0857 0.0854 -0.0413 0.0271 
  (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0767) (0.0518)  (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0833) (0.0517) 
service workers  -0.126** -0.126** -0.171** -0.120**  -0.0234 -0.0242 -0.0216 -0.0420 
  (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0627) (0.0414)  (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0725) (0.0440) 
household income   -0.0680*** -0.0680*** -0.0682*** -0.0694***  -0.0571*** -0.0571*** -0.0570*** -0.0620*** 
  (0.00559) (0.00559) (0.00559) (0.00560)  (0.00543) (0.00543) (0.00542) (0.00543) 
age  0.00457*** 0.00457*** 0.00457*** 0.00384***  0.00641*** 0.00640*** 0.00639*** 0.00534*** 
  (0.000786) (0.000786) (0.000786) (0.000786)  (0.000790) (0.000790) (0.000790) (0.000790) 
sex  0.112*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.108***  0.0673* 0.0675* 0.0687* 0.0723* 
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  (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0285)  (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0287) 
education  -0.0213* -0.0213* -0.0213* -0.0232*  -0.00319 -0.00315 -0.00358 -0.00670 
  (0.00914) (0.00914) (0.00914) (0.00912)  (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00496) (0.00495) 
foreign-
born_individual 
 0.0163 0.109 0.109 0.103  0.0181 0.0330 0.0337 0.0316 
  (0.0161) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0583)  (0.0182) (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0322) 
GDP per capita   0.0000132 0.0000131 0.0000128   -0.00000309 -0.00000333 -0.00000557 
   (0.0000153) (0.0000153) (0.0000149)   (0.0000115) (0.0000114) (0.0000108) 
unemployment rate   0.0678 0.0684 0.0713   0.0686** 0.0688** 0.0704** 
   (0.0703) (0.0704) (0.0683)   (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0244) 
human development 
index 
  -4.260 -4.172 -4.655   8.178 8.437 7.653 
   (7.602) (7.611) (7.393)   (6.946) (6.935) (6.566) 
foreign-born_country   -0.124 -0.124 -0.115   -0.0268 -0.0274 -0.0224 
   (0.0830) (0.0831) (0.0807)   (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0430) 
large employers/self-
employed*inflows 
   -0.0141      0.361**  
    (0.137)      (0.132)  
small business 
owners*inflows 
   0.0966      -0.0843  
    (0.0670)      (0.0809)  
technical 
professionals*inflows 
   0.119      0.142  





     Reference group 
    
            
(assosiate) 
managers*inflows 
   0.0316      0.0660  
    (0.0625)      (0.0687)  
Clerks*inflows    0.00882      -0.142  




   0.106      0.138  
    (0.0675)      (0.0728)  
service 
workers*inflows 
   0.0536      -0.00349  
    (0.0545)      (0.0689)  




    Reference 
group 
    
           
1     -0.470**     0.00971 
     (0.145)     (0.168) 
2     -0.567***     -0.379** 
     (0.129)     (0.139) 
3     -0.646***     -0.256* 
     (0.119)     (0.123) 
4     -0.668***     -0.347** 
     (0.121)     (0.124) 
5     -0.528***     -0.151 
     (0.111)     (0.112) 
6     -0.738***     -0.123 
     (0.118)     (0.120) 
7     -0.439***     -0.0498 
     (0.116)     (0.117) 
8     -0.198     0.0203 
     (0.119)     (0.122) 
9     -0.264     0.424* 
     (0.155)     (0.169) 
Most people can be 
trusted 
    0.0320     0.540** 
     (0.191)     (0.197) 




    Reference 
group 
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1*inflows     0.352*     -0.300 
     (0.147)     (0.178) 
2*inflows     0.243     0.105 
     (0.129)     (0.137) 
3*inflows     0.264*     0.0588 
     (0.120)     (0.120) 
4*inflows     0.295*     0.0860 
     (0.119)     (0.118) 
5*inflows     0.272*     0.0206 
     (0.113)     (0.110) 
6*inflows     0.295*     0.0699 
     (0.118)     (0.116) 
7*inflows     0.264*     0.128 
     (0.116)     (0.112) 
8*inflows     0.220     0.239* 
     (0.118)     (0.117) 
9*inflows     0.310*     0.0849 
     (0.150)     (0.161) 
Most people can be 
trusted*inflows 
    0.210     0.226 
     (0.184)     (0.180) 
Constant 6.766*** 6.824*** 9.950 9.913 10.80 -0.654*** -0.671*** -0.872*** -0.873*** -0.930*** 
 (0.209) (0.257) (6.016) (6.023) (5.851) (0.169) (0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) 
N 25283 25283 25283 25283 25283 24565 24565 24565 24565 24565 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Note: each year’s model 1 includes only the explanatory variable. Model 2 with individual control variables. Model 3 with 
individual and control variables. Model 4 includes interaction effects between interpersonal trust and relative inflows of immigrants with control variables. Model 5 
includes interaction effects between occupations and relative inflows of immigrants with control variables.  




Table. 3 Multi-level linear regression models for the childcare policy in 2008 and 2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 
Relative inflows of 
immigrants -0.249 -0.258 0.0183 -0.0508 -0.0678 -0.201 -0.103 0.497 0.509 0.478 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.258) (0.260) (0.275) (0.273) (0.285) (0.310) (0.312) (0.318) 
large employers/self-
employed 
 -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.494*** -0.336***  -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.386** -0.347*** 
  (0.0882) (0.0882) (0.144) (0.0881)  (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.145) (0.0835) 
small business owners  -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.327*** -0.239***  -0.267*** -0.267*** -0.190* -0.278*** 
  (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0742) (0.0476)  (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0801) (0.0475) 
technical professionals  -0.174** -0.173** -0.259** -0.165**  -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.168 -0.234*** 
  (0.0554) (0.0554) (0.0901) (0.0553)  (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0869) (0.0525) 
production workers Reference group 
    Reference 
group 
    
           
(assosiate) managers  -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.299*** -0.253***  -0.119** -0.118** -0.162* -0.122** 
  (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0663) (0.0442)  (0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0734) (0.0449) 
Clerks  -0.152** -0.152** -0.210** -0.131**  -0.174*** -0.174*** -0.0645 -0.172*** 
  (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0755) (0.0488)  (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0815) (0.0497) 
socio-cultural 
professionals 
 -0.0199 -0.0195 -0.104 -0.00881  0.0355 0.0364 -0.0277 0.0275 
  (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0724) (0.0490)  (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0779) (0.0485) 
service workers  -0.117** -0.117** -0.210*** -0.108**  -0.0247 -0.0241 -0.0104 -0.0317 
  (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0592) (0.0391)  (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0679) (0.0412) 
household income   -0.0362*** -0.0361*** -0.0362*** -0.0340***  -0.00830 -0.00833 -0.00832 -0.00773 
  (0.00527) (0.00527) (0.00527) (0.00529)  (0.00508) (0.00507) (0.00507) (0.00509) 









  (0.000742) (0.000742) (0.000742) (0.000743)  (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.000741) 
sex  0.240*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.233***  0.289*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.286*** 
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  (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270)  (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0269) 
education  -0.00732 -0.00733 -0.00751 -0.00618  -0.0104* -0.0104* -0.0104* -0.0111* 
  (0.00863) (0.00863) (0.00863) (0.00861)  (0.00464) (0.00464) (0.00464) (0.00464) 
foreign-born_individual  0.000253 0.0550 0.0548 0.0539  -0.0179 0.0619 0.0621 0.0593 
  (0.0184) (0.0688) (0.0689) (0.0687)  (0.0231) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0417) 
GDP per capita   -0.00000563 -0.00000577 -0.00000599   -0.0000210 -0.0000211 -0.0000219 
   (0.0000175) (0.0000175) (0.0000175)   (0.0000143) (0.0000143) (0.0000140) 
unemployment rate   0.0992 0.0996 0.0978   0.00811 0.00812 0.00825 
   (0.0806) (0.0807) (0.0805)   (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0315) 
human development 
index 
  0.604 0.714 0.946   1.655 1.700 1.601 
   (8.719) (8.725) (8.709)   (8.641) (8.636) (8.489) 
foreign-born_country   -0.0744 -0.0742 -0.0727   -0.0837 -0.0837 -0.0794 
   (0.0952) (0.0953) (0.0951)   (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0556) 
large employers/self-
employed*inflows 
   0.180      0.0554  
    (0.129)      (0.124)  
small business 
owners*inflows 
   0.0930      -0.0905  
    (0.0633)      (0.0757)  
technical 
professionals*inflows 
   0.104      -0.0714  





     Reference group 
    
            
(assosiate) 
managers*inflows 
   0.0435      0.0433  
    (0.0590)      (0.0643)  
Clerks*inflows    0.0703      -0.121  




   0.101      0.0662  
    (0.0637)      (0.0681)  
service workers*inflows    0.110*      -0.0170  
    (0.0514)      (0.0644)  
you can't be too careful Reference group 
    Reference 
group 
    
           
1     -0.287*     -0.445** 
     (0.137)     (0.158) 
2     -0.280*     -0.644*** 
     (0.122)     (0.130) 
3     -0.489***     -0.589*** 
     (0.113)     (0.116) 
4     -0.690***     -0.578*** 
     (0.114)     (0.116) 
5     -0.485***     -0.353*** 
     (0.105)     (0.105) 
6     -0.797***     -0.554*** 
     (0.112)     (0.112) 
7     -0.655***     -0.447*** 
     (0.109)     (0.109) 
8     -0.343**     -0.339** 
     (0.112)     (0.114) 
9     -0.402**     0.00454 
     (0.146)     (0.159) 
Most people can be 
trusted 
    -0.382*     0.157 
     (0.181)     (0.184) 




    Reference 
group 
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1*inflows     0.00198     -0.00470 
     (0.139)     (0.167) 
2*inflows     -0.0709     0.107 
     (0.122)     (0.128) 
3*inflows     0.0430     0.0748 
     (0.114)     (0.113) 
4*inflows     0.163     0.0465 
     (0.113)     (0.111) 
5*inflows     0.0496     -0.0634 
     (0.107)     (0.103) 
6*inflows     0.187     0.0813 
     (0.112)     (0.109) 
7*inflows     0.195     0.0421 
     (0.109)     (0.105) 
8*inflows     0.00217     0.0364 
     (0.111)     (0.109) 
9*inflows     0.112     -0.263 
     (0.142)     (0.151) 
Most people can be 
trusted*inflows 
    0.205     -0.0461 
     (0.174)     (0.168) 
Constant 7.880*** 8.178*** 7.303 7.268 7.529 -0.404* -0.427* -0.648*** -0.648*** -0.666*** 
 (0.236) (0.290) (6.900) (6.905) (6.893) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
N 25283 25283 25283 25283 25283 24565 24565 24565 24565 24565 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Note: each year’s model 1 includes only the explanatory variable. Model 2 with individual control variables. Model 3 with 
individual and control variables. Model 4 includes interaction effects between interpersonal trust and relative inflows of immigrants with control variables. Model 5 
includes interaction effects between occupations and relative inflows of immigrants with control variables.  
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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Table. 4 Difference in differences table for the pension policy  
Time  2008 2016 Diff-in-diff 
Control 9.023 8.865  
Treated 8.863 8.714  
diff (T-C) -0.159 -0.151 0.008 
 0.17 0.81  
R-square: 0.05. * Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression.  
**Clustered Std. Errors. **Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
